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Legal scholarship on intellectual property needs to be reoriented to consider 
how state action helps to generate the infrastructure of emerging fields in ways that 
prove conducive to their development. In this Article, I contribute to that 
reorientation through an in-depth analysis of one important emerging technology, 
synthetic biology. The ambition of synthetic biology is to make biology easier to 
engineer through standardization and associated technical processes. Early 
successes indicate the scientific promise of the field and help to explain why its 
advocates are concerned to see the field develop in an open and publicly beneficial 
manner. What openness might mean in the patent-dominated context of 
biotechnology remains unclear, however, and requires a reassessment of software’s 
“copyleft” concept that provided initial inspiration to the scientists and activists 
working on open synthetic biology.  
In this Article, I focus on the efforts of the BioBricks Foundation (BBF), the 
leading non-profit in synthetic biology, to promote the open development of the 
field. I explore the rationale behind the BBF’s decision to pursue a “public domain” 
strategy via a new legal agreement, the BioBrick™ Public Agreement. The success 
of open development in synthetic biology depends, however, not only on the 
particular form of legal license or agreement used to govern the distribution of 
innovation, but on overcoming what I call “infrastructure gaps” that inhibit 
cooperative action toward collective outcomes. Such cooperation is the hallmark of 
peer production projects in the information economy and the hope of many 
synthetic biologists is to replicate that success in biotechnology.  
The viability of this public domain strategy for open synthetic biology depends 
on establishing peer production without the backing of legal coercion provided 
through a “share-alike” licensing provision as seen in free software. In scrutinizing 
the motivations behind peer production, I borrow from recent philosophical work 
to argue for the potential rationality of decentralized cooperation, even where 
individual contributions to a collective project are small. Such cooperation depends, 
however, on threshold effects that mark points where individual contributions 
become efficacious in producing desired collective outcomes. In many emerging 
fields, including synthetic biology, these thresholds may be characterized by the 
presence or absence of shared technical platforms that enable further innovation.  
 
to say, anyone reading this text—are in his debt. And if the twenty-first century sees the open 
development of beneficial biotechnologies, that, too, will be owing partly to Mark’s early efforts. 
This Article would have been much improved by his insights and advice, which he always gave 
so generously to the many projects and people he supported in his wondrously full life. He is 
missed. 
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Platforms are special kinds of infrastructure, as recent work from law and 
political economy has shown. The question of how such platforms are to be 
produced requires considering further the role of state action in infrastructure 
provision. I argue that the success of openness in synthetic biology depends on 
meeting infrastructural prerequisites that are mainly, if not exclusively, provided 
through state action. Such state action may proceed, however, through “hidden” 
modalities of the kind that theorists of industrial organization have identified, and 
which ought to be a central concern of legal scholars and advocates interested in 
the theory and practice of open source technology development. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the 1990s, and drawing on the occasional hint from earlier 
decades, scientists working in areas such as molecular biology, biochemistry, and 
some areas of biological engineering began to explore the possibility of 
standardization in the life sciences. What standardization might mean in the life 
sciences was (and remains) contested, but the examples from which these scientists 
drew analogies were clear. Standardization of some kind is central, perhaps even 
constitutive, of almost any contemporary scientific or industrial process.1 
Proponents of standardization in the life sciences already employed standards 
familiar to all the experimental sciences—protocols of measurement, 
communication, and data management necessary for the transmission and 
confirmation of scientific results—and they wondered whether standards regulating 
physical manipulation and control comparable to those in engineering and other 
applied sciences might have analogues or extensions in the field of biology.2  
 
 1.  On standardization, see STEPHEN MIHM, MASTERING MODERNITY: WEIGHTS, 
MEASURES, AND THE STANDARDIZATION OF AMERICAN LIFE (forthcoming 2017); STANDARDS AND 
THEIR STORIES: HOW QUANTIFYING, CLASSIFYING, AND FORMALIZING PRACTICES SHAPE EVERYDAY 
LIFE (Martha Lampland & Susan Leigh Star eds., 2009); Stefan Timmermans & Steven Epstein, A 
World of Standards but Not a Standard World: Toward a Sociology of Standards and 
Standardization, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 69, 89 (2010). See generally DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK 
POWER (2008). 
 2.  See, e.g., Drew Endy, Foundations for Engineering Biology, 438 NATURE 449 (2005). 
For a discussion of Endy’s ground-breaking article, see MANUEL PORCAR & JULI PERETÓ, 
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: FROM IGEM TO THE ARTIFICIAL CELL 45-46 (2014). See also discussion infra 
Part II.A. 
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Their endeavor was marked by the denomination of a new subfield: “synthetic 
biology,” which might more simply have been called bioengineering or biological 
engineering if those terms were not already in use to describe the disciplines of 
applied agricultural or medical engineering.3 The mission of synthetic biology, 
according to Drew Endy, one of its leading theorists and practitioners, is to “make 
biology easy to engineer.”4 The strategy is to produce and promote engineering 
standards at the bio-molecular level, with the aim of developing a suite of “standard 
biological parts”5 to replace the current ad hoc, artisanal methods common in 
biotechnology.  
Alongside this defining scientific and technical ambition, the early pioneers of 
synthetic biology shared a commitment to the development of the field in an open 
manner. As with standardization, the question of what “openness” might mean in 
this domain was (and remains) contested. Again, however, the examples from 
which these scientists drew analogies were clear. The early pioneers of synthetic 
biology were almost all academics working beneath the protective umbrella of a de 
facto “research exemption” from claims of intellectual property infringement,6 and 
were therefore accustomed to the relatively free flow of ideas in a competitive 
status-system based on publicity not price.7 Moreover, they had before them—and 
used daily—the fruits of the earlier open source revolution in computing.8 In fact, a 
number of the seminal figures in the early development of synthetic biology were 
polymath scientists who migrated mid-career from electronics or computer science 
 
 3.  It was familiar in academic nomenclature to call medical engineering “bioengineering” 
and agricultural engineering “biological engineering” before synthetic biology was inaugurated as 
a field. This is now changing, with both terms being used to describe more foundational 
approaches associated with synthetic biology and allied fields. For example, the new Stanford 
Department of Bioengineering was established in 2002 and is intended to “develop 
bioengineering as a fundamental engineering discipline.” See Department Overview, STANFORD 
BIOENGINEERING (May 14, 2017), https://bioengineering.stanford.edu/about/department 
-overview [https://perma.cc/YDV7-LHYX]. The first use of the term “synthetic biology” is 
widely cited to Nobel Laureate Waclaw Szybalski, who called in 1978 for a “new era of ‘synthetic 
biology’ where not only existing genes are described and analyzed but also new gene 
arrangements can be constructed and evaluated.” Waclaw Szybalski & Ann Skalka, Nobel Prizes 
and Restriction Enzymes, 4 GENE 181, 181-82 (1978). But see Luis Campos, That Was the 
Synthetic Biology that Was, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: THE TECHNOSCIENCE AND ITS SOCIETAL 
CONSEQUENCES 5 (Markus Schmidt, et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the early history of 
standardization efforts in biology and early twentieth-century uses of the term “synthetic 
biology,” apparently unknown to later scientists, including Szybalski’s own failure to recollect his 
early use in 1978 once the field had emerged in earnest several decades later. See id. at 6 n.2). 
 4.  See generally Endy, supra note 2. 
 5.  For a discussion of the concept of standardized parts, see infra Part II.A. 
 6.  See DAVID MOWERY, ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 186-87 (2004) (discussing the de facto academic research exemption). 
 7.  See generally Paul Blackmore & Camille Kandiko, Motivation in Academic Life: A 
Prestige Economy, 16 RES. POST-COMPULSORY EDUC. 399 (2011) (describing academic work as 
motivated by considerations of prestige, not profit). 
 8.  See generally OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (Chris 
DiBona & Sam Ockman eds., 1999) for a collection of manifestos, interviews, and comments from 
the pioneers of F/OSS in computing. 
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to biotechnology, bringing with them both an engineering mindset and a first-hand 
knowledge of technological innovation in an arena marked for a decade or more by 
the promulgation of “free” or “open source” software (F/OSS).9 These dual 
commitments to standardization and openness were notable from the first 
development of synthetic biology and contrasted strikingly with established 
practice in much of the biotechnology industry, in which the technical possibility 
of standardization remains underexplored,10 and in which aggressive patenting is a 
central aspect of business strategy.11  
More than a decade has passed since the emergence of the field,12 and it is now 
possible to assess the advances made in these two core commitments to 
standardization and openness. In terms of standardization, the past few years have 
seen some striking early confirmations of its promise, which are notable against the 
backdrop of continuing skepticism about its applicability to the life sciences.13 Early 
successes have included the use of engineered strains of yeast to produce the anti-
malarial drug artemisinin at a fraction of the price of the naturally derived 
compound,14 and the popularity of the annual “International Genetically 
Engineered Machines” (iGEM) competition, a synthetic biology contest in which 
thousands of college and high school students from around the world use standard 
biological parts to produce novel biological constructs.15 Less publicly visible but 
extremely important theoretical and experimental breakthroughs include the 
possibility of precisely controlling gene expression, a prerequisite for building 
sophisticated genetic systems.16 Likewise, the arrival of a powerful new technique 
 
 9.  For example, Tom Knight and Randy Rettberg both migrated mid-career from careers 
in computer and electrical engineering to biology; among other achievements, Knight had helped 
construct the first ARPANET (the precursor to the Internet) and Rettberg the Internet protocol 
suite (TCP/IP). Both were later founding members of the BBF. Anne Trafton, Rewiring Cells: 
How a Handful of MIT Electrical Engineers Pioneered Synthetic Biology, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Apr. 19, 2011), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/423703/rewiring-cells [https://perma 
.cc/XM8F-B683]. 
 10.  See Alistair Elfick, Constrained Creativity: An Engineer’s Perspective, in SYNTHETIC 
AESTHETICS: INVESTIGATING SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY’S DESIGNS ON NATURE 181, 187 (Alexandra Daisy 
Ginsberg, et al. eds., 2014) (“Genetic modification (GM) of the late twentieth century was a 
practical art, highly skilled, artisan, and craft-like. DNA was tailored for bespoke production of 
high value products.”); see also Timothy Gardner & Kristy Hawkins, Synthetic Biology: Evolution 
or Revolution? A Co-Founder’s Perspective, 17 CURRENT OPINIONS CHEMICAL BIOLOGY. 871, 874 
(2013) (“Also driving the convergence of thought [concerning standardization in cellular 
engineering] was a frustration with the artisanal methods of the past two decades of genetic 
engineering.”). 
 11.  See generally Sharon Oriel, Making a Return on R&D: A Business Perspective, in THE 
ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 118 (David Castle ed., 
2009) (discussing the role of patents in biotechnology sector). 
 12.  Editorial, Ten Years of Synergy, 463 NATURE 269 (2010). 
 13.  For cautions about the field’s technical potential, see Roberta Kwok, Five Hard Truths 
for Synthetic Biology, 463 NATURE 288 (2010). 
 14.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 15.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 16.  See infra notes 75-79 on the use of bicistronic architecture to achieve precise gene 
expression, thus demonstrating the potential to construct “standard biological parts.” 
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for editing genes—the use of “clustered regularly-interspaced short palindromic 
repeats” or CRISPR—demonstrates not only the growing possibility of reliable and 
cheap gene editing, but the enormous demand for such methods in 
biotechnology.17 
These and other breakthroughs suggest that the standardization agenda of 
synthetic biology, and the broader mission of turning biology into an engineering 
discipline, will come to fruition—though the progress may prove slower than early 
advocates had hoped. How has the commitment to the open development of 
synthetic biology fared? This Article focuses on the history of recent legal efforts to 
achieve “openness” in synthetic biology. I necessarily consider what openness might 
mean in synthetic biology and allied disciplines, as well as the future prospects for 
open development in biotechnology generally. While the example of “copyleft”18 in 
F/OSS projects—the use of unconventional copyright licenses that require open 
source code and the sharing of derivative works—has proven enormously 
influential, no similar hack has yet proven conducive to the open development of 
biotechnology, despite several years of legal work aimed at advancing it. In 
analyzing these dynamics, I focus in some detail on the efforts of the main 
organization working to promote open synthetic biology, the BioBricks 
Foundation (BBF). Despite initial enthusiasm for a copyleft analogue for 
biotechnology, the BBF ultimately decided to pursue what might be called a “public 
domain” agenda via a new legal agreement, the BioBrick™ Public Agreement, which 
lacks the “share-alike” provisions of several F/OSS licenses, most importantly, the 
GNU Public License (GPL). 
While I am mostly concerned with understanding the legal governance of 
innovation in synthetic biology, this case study may offer broader lessons for 
scholars interested in technology law, including the organization of open-source 
communities. One of the main conclusions of this Article is that the model of 
copyleft in F/OSS, which has established the paradigm of open technical 
development, has proved of limited applicability to “wetware”19 rather than 
software. I suggest this is so for two reasons. The first is the difference in legal 
governance between the copyright-based industry of software and the patent-based 
 
 17.  CRISPR promises to reduce dramatically the cost and difficulty of editing DNA. Unlike 
its expensive and complicated precursor technology, the use of zinc finger nucleotides in gene 
editing, the CRISPR method is reliable and cheap: 
it relies on an enzyme called Cas9 that uses a guide RNA molecule to home in on its target DNA, 
then edits the DNA to disrupt genes or insert desired sequences. Researchers often need to order 
only the RNA fragment; the other components can be bought off the shelf. Total cost: as little as 
$30. 
Heidi Ledford, CRISPR, the Disruptor, 522 NATURE 20, 21 (2015). 
 18.  The term “copyleft” was coined by free software pioneer Richard Stallman to describe 
the deployment of copyright law to anti-proprietary effect. See SAM WILLIAMS, FREE AS IN 
FREEDOM: RICHARD STALLMAN AND THE FREE SOFTWARE REVOLUTION 128-29 (2010) (on the use 
of “copyleft” in first the GNU Emacs license and then the famous GPL). 
 19.  OPENWETWARE (June 20, 2014), http://openwetware.org/wiki/Main_Page [http:// 
perma.cc/YT6N-PEXV] (adapting the use of “hardware” and “software” from computing to 
describe biological organisms and parts as “wetware”). 
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domain of biotechnology.20 The second is the magnitude of what has been termed 
the “capital cost”21 of effective open development, where this cost is determined by 
the presence (or absence) of a viable technical platform for biotechnological 
innovation.22 Synthetic biology lacks the advantages that F/OSS advocates and 
practitioners have long taken for granted: a legal regime that can be made conducive 
to sharing as well as established technical infrastructures that support it.  
A detailed investigation of the obstacles to achieving openness in synthetic 
biology should prove of relevance beyond the confines of biotechnology. Many 
other emerging technical fields are also subject to patenting and lack a viable—and 
open—platform conducive to further innovation. The experience of synthetic 
biology suggests not only that the model of open licensing developed for F/OSS 
may not port easily to other technical domains, but that open-source advocates 
should consider more carefully how open collaboration depends upon 
infrastructural resources that cannot themselves be bootstrapped into existence 
through legal hacks or generated piecemeal in an uncoordinated fashion by 
communities of innovators. 
Focusing on the role that technical platforms play in enabling innovation 
suggests a possible precondition to what legal scholars have termed “commons-
based peer production” (or “peer production” for short).23 In emerging fields, 
infrastructures of many kinds prove prerequisites for the production of innovation, 
whether that production is achieved in a conventional proprietary manner or 
through the activity of open communities working with shared resources. Drawing 
lessons from the example of synthetic biology, I conclude that for at least some 
scientific or technical communities, effective state action to close “infrastructure 
gaps” constitutes a prerequisite for the success of peer production. Such state action 
may proceed through mechanisms of public funding, governmental coordination, 
or other more subtle elements of industrial policy. 
A focus on infrastructure gaps offers a way to reconsider the role of the state 
in innovation policy. In recent decades, legal scholarship has been transformed by 
the study of successful examples of peer production, which have complicated and 
challenged older narratives concerning the role of conventional incentives 
 
 20.  See infra Part III.B. 
 21.  See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of 
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 278 (2004). For a critical note 
on the idea of “capital cost” as so used, see GREWAL, supra note 1, at 218. 
 22.  See discussion infra Part V.B-C. 
 23.  See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (arguing that the declining costs of 
communication and access to media in the so-called “networked information economy” lead to a 
new mode of production: decentralized, commons-based peer production); Yochai Benkler, 
Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (2002) (discussing 
“peer production” in the context of F/OSS); Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards 
a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256 (2003) (discussing the ideal of the 
digital commons); Benkler, supra note 21 (extending the idea beyond the F/OSS context to 
diagnose a more general mode of production where technological circumstances permit); see also 
infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text. 
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provided by intellectual property in the production of innovation. The role of the 
“commons” or the sharing community is now increasingly recognized in studies of 
innovation, which complement and correct earlier presuppositions predicated on a 
market-based transactional framework.24 One effect of the focus on the commons 
has been a skeptical stance toward coordinated public action achieved through the 
instrumentality of the state.25 However salutary this has been in some respects, the 
next reorientation in intellectual property scholarship must be towards “bringing 
the state back in”26 by studying the prerequisites for production in either market or 
non-market transactional frameworks, particularly the role of coordinated public 
action in overcoming infrastructure gaps. 
This Article is intended as a contribution to that reorientation through a 
detailed analysis of the case of synthetic biology. I begin in Part II by introducing 
the ambition of synthetic biology to “make biology easier to engineer” through 
standardization and associated technical processes. Here, I also outline some of the 
early successes that indicate the promise of this field—and which help to explain 
why its pioneers have been keen to see it develop in an open and publicly beneficial 
manner.27 In Part III, I turn to the question of how this commitment to openness 
has fared, examining the strained analogy to copyleft and the reasons for which the 
BioBricks Foundation has pursued a “public domain” strategy to promote openness.  
The success of this strategy depends on the viability of peer production, since 
without a legal mechanism to ensure “commons-expansion,”28 the growth of the 
synthetic biology commons will have to occur through voluntary contributions of 
the kind familiar in other open technical endeavors. I argue for the rationality of 
peer production in Part IV, at least under particular conditions. However, such 
cooperation in projects of peer production will often depend on the viability of the 
collective enterprise as a whole, as determined by thresholds above which 
individual contributions prove efficacious, but below which contributions prove 
wasted effort.  
In the context of synthetic biology—and probably many other emerging fields—
these thresholds are determined by the presence or absence of shared technical 
platforms that enable innovation. Platforms are special kinds of infrastructure, and 
may best be understood as partitioning a system into a small number of stable, core 
components (the “platform”) and a larger number of variable ones (“applications” 
 
 24.  See Benkler, supra note 21, at 305-07 (analyzing market, state and commons as 
“transactional frameworks”). 
 25.  See text accompanying infra notes 332-336. 
 26.  On what “bringing the state back in” might mean for intellectual property law 
scholarship, see infra note 338 and accompanying text. 
 27.  For example, the BioBricks Foundation describes its origins among scientists who 
wished “to ensure that this emerging field would serve the public interest,” and elaborates its 
mission as ensuring that “the engineering of biology is conducted in an open and ethical manner 
to benefit all people and the planet.” BIOBRICKS FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://biobricks.org/about 
-foundation [http://perma.cc/UH7M-EDEA]. 
 28.  On “commons-expanding” legal arrangements, see infra note 160 and accompanying 
text. 
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or “products”), and structuring the interfaces between them. For example, in 
synthetic biology, a core set of standard biological parts (and associated standards) 
would provide a platform for downstream development of either a proprietary or 
an open variety. It is this platform that constitutes the essential prerequisite for the 
production of further innovation in the field. Drawing on the analysis of 
infrastructure and platforms, I diagnose an “infrastructure gap” where a key 
foundational resource is missing. Synthetic biology is marked by a number of 
infrastructure gaps that currently inhibit its development on either a proprietary or 
peer production model.  
For reasons I discuss briefly in Part V, neither market-based nor commons-
based peer production can be counted on to overcome the infrastructure gaps that 
will inhibit both forms of production. Instead, I argue, the success of synthetic 
biology, including its open development, requires the development of platform 
infrastructures that ultimately only the state can provide, recognizing that these 
may emerge through innovative forms of partnership with respect to funding and 
industry governance. Successful state action may proceed through “hidden” 
modalities of the kind that theorists of industrial organization have begun to 
diagnose,29 and which I argue should be the focus of much greater attention in the 
legal scholarship on innovation and its governance. 
II.   ENGINEERING LIFE: THE PROMISE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
In 2003, MIT researcher Tom Knight, who was then working in an artificial 
intelligence laboratory, outlined a proposal for an “assembly standard” for genetic 
engineering.30 In place of ad hoc tinkering and artisanal approaches, Knight argued 
that biotechnology should advance through the use of standard, interchangeable 
genetic constructs that could be used in building biological systems. In that task, an 
“idempotent vector”31 of the kind he developed would prove foundational for 
further biotechnological innovation. Knight drew a direct analogy with the 
standardization of screws in the industrial economy and expressed the hope that 
similar progress could be made in standardizing biological “parts.”32 
 
 29.  See infra text accompanying notes 323-326 
 30.  Tom Knight, MIT Intelligence Lab, Idempotent Vector Design for Standard Assembly 
of BioBricks (2003), http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/21168 [http://perma.cc/UT8X 
-DL3X]. Knight’s standard is now considered the original BioBrick™ assembly standard: 
“Assembly Standard 10” in the iGEM Registry of Standard Biological Parts. The Registry of 
Standard Biological Parts, formerly operated out of MIT by Randy Rettberg, is now run through 
iGEM. See also Tom Knight, Draft Standard for BioBrick Biological Parts (2007), 
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/45138 [http://perma.cc/B2JR-BSXQ]. 
 31.  Knight, Idempotent Vector Design, supra note 30, at 2 (describing an “idempotent 
vector” as one which participates in processes where “each reaction leaves the key structural 
elements of the component the same”). Such idempotent vectors are interchangeable parts in the 
sense that they can be transferred to perform the same function in an analogous environment. 
 32.  As Knight explained: 
We anticipate advantages similar to those which accompany the standardization of screw threads 
in mechanical design—the widespread ability to interchange parts, to assemble sub-components, 
to outsource assembly to others, and to rely extensively on previously manufactured components. 
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In synthetic biology, the concept of a “standard biological part” encompasses 
genetic material such as DNA, plasmids, protein coding sequences, ribosomal 
binding sites, and so on, including combinations of parts that together attain special 
functionality, called “devices,” such as inverters, receptors and protein generators.33 
To describe the varied and complex material of life in this manner is to employ a 
functionalist, engineering idiom unfamiliar to earlier generations of biological 
researchers, many of whom have been skeptical that biological components could 
ever be reliably engineered.34 However, along with Knight, several other 
scientists—many of them with backgrounds in engineering disciplines rather than 
biology—had similar ambitions with respect to biotechnology.35  
The late 1990s saw a convergent agenda on biological standardization, with 
academics at Boston University exploring “genetic applets,”36 researchers at the 
Molecular Sciences Institute in Berkeley37 performing early work on 
standardization (and coining the term “synthetic biology” to replace an earlier 
neologism, “intentional biology”),38 and scientists at Harvard,39 MIT,40 and 
elsewhere pursuing similar lines of inquiry. The ambition of these scientists was to 
make biology into a genuine engineering discipline, which they understood would 
 
Here, we present a simple sequence and assembly standard as part of an experiment to see how 
far this idea of standardized interface technology can be applied. The key notion in the design of 
our strategy is that the transformations performed on component parts during the assembly 
reactions are idempotent in a structural sense. That is, each reaction leaves the key structural 
elements of the component the same. The output of any such transformation, therefore, is a 
component which can be used as the input to any subsequent manipulation. It need never be 
constructed again—it can be added to the permanent library of previously assembled components, 
and used as a compound structure in more complex assemblies. 
Knight, Idempotent Vector Design, supra note 30, at 2. 
 33.  For a description and discussion of genetic material as “parts” and “devices,” see Barry 
Canton et al., Refinement and Standardization of Synthetic Biological Parts and Devices, 26 
NATURE BIOTECH. 787, 788-89 (2008). 
 34.  See infra text accompanying note 72. 
 35.  For discussions of the early history of synthetic biology by practitioners, see ROB 
CARLSON, BIOLOGY IS TECHNOLOGY: THE PROMISE, PERIL, AND NEW BUSINESS OF ENGINEERING LIFE 
84-86 (2010); GEORGE CHURCH & ED REGIS, REGENESIS: HOW SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY WILL REINVENT 
NATURE AND OURSELVES 184-89 (2012); Gardner & Hawkins, supra note 10, at 872-74. For a 
history of standardization efforts in biology, even in the pre-genomic era, see Campos, supra note 
3. 
 36.  Timothy S. Gardner, et al., Construction of a Toggle Switch in Escherichia coli, 403 
NATURE 339, 342 (2000). 
 37.  These researchers included Drew Endy, Rob Carlson, and Carlos Bustamante, among 
others. Drew Endy, frequently called an “evangelist” for the field of synthetic biology, is one of its 
most visible and effective proponents; for a history of Endy’s influence, see Luis Campos, 
Outsiders and In-Laws: Drew Endy and the Case of Synthetic Biology, in OUTSIDER SCIENTISTS: 
ROUTES TO INNOVATION IN BIOLOGY 331 (Oren Harman & Michael R. Dietrich eds., 2013). Endy 
later moved to MIT and is now a professor in the bioengineering department at Stanford 
University. Rob Carlson, a physicist by training, later became a consultant and strategist in the 
field of synthetic biology, as well as the author of BIOLOGY IS TECHNOLOGY, cited supra note 35, 
an accessible introduction to the field and its social and technical promise. 
 38.  See Campos, supra note 3, at 17. 
 39.  For example, George Church. See, e.g., CHURCH & REGIS, supra note 35. 
 40.  For example, Tom Knight. See, e.g., Knight, Idempotent Vector Design, supra note 30. 
154 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW Vol. 20:143 
entail standardized constructs and shared technical protocols. As an Editorial in 
Nature put it about a decade after: “those in the field may not agree on what it is, 
but they seem to know when it started.”41 
Synthetic biology would, if successful, turn biology into a technology,42 
completing a gradual move in this direction that has been occurring over the last 
century or more. The ambition of manipulating biology featured in a number of 
earlier twentieth-century studies, for example the interest in induced mutation and 
the mechanisms of heredity.43 More generally, these twentieth-century 
movements built on several millennia of agricultural innovation, much of it 
accidental, that has transformed most of the earth’s ecosystems through the 
propagation of a very small number of staple organisms: rice, wheat, corn, cotton, 
cows, and a few other species now absorb an enormously greater share of annual 
solar radiation than they did ten thousand years ago. The spread of agriculture itself 
may be understood as a massive, deliberate, but largely uncontrolled 
standardization of ecosystems at the planetary level.44  
What gives synthetic biology greater promise than these earlier efforts to 
control biology (whether at the level of organisms or ecosystems) is the mid-
twentieth century genetic revolution, which suggests the possibility of 
standardization from nucleotides through cellular parts and metabolic systems to 
living organisms and ecosystems. Indeed, while the ambition of synthetic biology 
remains radical, its technical practices rely on background discoveries and 
techniques that are now basic to genomics, including the discovery of protein 
synthesis45 and the invention of recombinant DNA.46 In historical retrospect, it 
may come to be seen as unsurprising that, fifty years after the initial discovery of 
DNA, and a few decades after genetic sequencing and synthesizing technologies 
 
 41.  Editorial, supra note 12, at 269. This convergence on an engineering paradigm for 
biotechnology is not surprising, but a comprehensive study of the inflection points in the 
emergence of an engineering discourse in biology, including its relation to technological changes 
in other areas of science, remains to be written. 
 42.  As in the title of Rob Carlson’s book, Biology is Technology. See CARLSON, supra note 
35. 
 43.  On the history of artificially induced mutations in twentieth-century biology 
(including before the era of genetic-scale engineering), see MAX PLANCK INST. FOR HIST. OF SCI., 
MAKING MUTATIONS: OBJECTS, PRACTICES, CONTEXTS (Luis Campos & Alexander von Schwerin 
eds., 2009); see also Campos, supra note 3. 
 44.  On human-induced natural change and its consequences, see JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER 
NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE (2015). 
 45.  The central dogma of biology provides the conceptual framework for protein 
synthesis, whereby DNA is transcribed into complementary messenger RNA (mRNA) sequences, 
which in turn provide the templates for the creation of proteins. These mRNA sequences encode 
for amino acids, the building blocks of proteins, in a series of 3-nucleic segments called “codons.” 
For foundational articles, see F.H.C. Crick, On Protein Synthesis, 12 SYMP. SOC’Y FOR 
EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY 138 (1958); François Jacob & Jacques Monod., Genetic Regulatory 
Mechanisms in the Synthesis of Proteins, 3 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 318 (1961). 
 46.  See Stanley N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids 
in Vitro., 70 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3240 (1973); Stanley N. Cohen et al., Nonchromosomal 
Antibiotic Resistance in Bacteria: Genetic Transformation of Escherichia coli by R-Factor DNA, 
69 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 2110 (1972). 
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became widely available,47 scientists converged on the ambition to transform 
biology into an engineering discipline on par with practices familiar outside the life 
sciences. It nevertheless remains a highly controversial and surprising thought that 
living matter may prove as “engineerable” as the piles of sand and lumps of 
unrefined metal ore out of which humans have constructed tools to transform the 
landscape-level ecology of the earth.48  
The enterprise of synthetic biology rather obviously raises numerous 
bioethical controversies.49 Its success to any reasonable extent would furthermore 
have significant economic,50 social and cultural,51 environmental,52 aesthetic,53 
 
 47.  For an excellent history and overview of genetics, see Horace Freeland Judson, A 
History of the Science and Technology Behind Gene Mapping and Sequencing, in THE CODE OF 
CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 37 (Daniel Kevles & Leroy 
Hood eds., 1992). 
 48.  Note that among professional engineers, the ambition to engineer biological systems 
is increasingly accepted and far less surprising than for non-engineers, and has become the 
substance of white papers that transcend engineering subspecialties. See, e.g., Stanford 
Engineering, How Good Can We Get at Engineering Living Matter? (2015), 
https://dh1rvgpokacch.cloudfront.net/atavist/63313/document/raw/whitepaperh-1448049335 
-72.pdf [http://perma.cc/KK95-5FPX]. 
 49.  James Anderson et al., Engineering and Ethical Perspectives in Synthetic Biology, 13 
EMBO REP. 584 (2012); Ainsley J. Newson, Current Ethical Issues in Synthetic Biology: Where 
Should We Go From Here?, 18 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 181 (2011); Paul Rabinow & Gaymon 
Bennett, Synthetic Biology: Ethical Ramifications 2009, 3 SYST. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 99 (2009); 
Paul B. Thompson., Synthetic Biology Needs a Synthetic Bioethics, 15 ETHICS POL’Y ENV’T 1 
(2012). 
 50.  There has been relatively little work attempting to ascertain the likely economic impact 
of synthetic biology. On the size of the “bieconomy” overall, see Robert Carlson, Estimating the 
Biotech Sector’s Contribution to the US Economy, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 247 (2016); and 
for an early effort, see Robert Carlson, Laying the Foundations for a Bio-Economy, 1 SYST. 
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 109 (2007). According to an estimate by Carlson, the bioeconomy is over 2% 
of US GDP; as he acknowledges, this figure probably undercounts many relevant commodity 
flows. This percentage is also bound to grow enormously if synthetic biology realizes its early 
promise. See Robert Carlson, The Need for Bioeconomy Data and Metrics 1 (2014), 
https://cns.asu.edu/sites/default/files/carlsonr_synbiopaper_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/6BRV 
-XYVH]; see also Jim C. Philp et al., Synthetic Biology, the Bioeconomy, and a Societal Quandary, 
31 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 269 (2013). For an ambitious attempt at a critical political economy 
of genomics as part of a “biocapitalist” regime, see KAUSIK SUNDER RAJAN, BIOCAPITAL: THE 
CONSTITUTION OF POSTGENOMIC LIFE (2006). 
 51.  SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: THE TECHNOSCIENCE AND ITS SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES (Markus 
Schmidt et al. eds., 2009); Markus Schmidt et al., A Priority Paper for the Societal and Ethical 
Aspects of Synthetic Biology, 3 SYST. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 3 (2009); Helge Torgersen, Synthetic 
Biology in Society: Learning from Past Experience?, 3 SYST. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 9 (2009). 
 52.  Potential environmental risks, especially related to biodiversity, have been discussed 
by the international Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). See U.N. Env’t Programme, 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Subsidiary Body on Sci., Technical and Tech. Advice, New 
and Emerging Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity—Potential 
Positive and Negative Impacts of Components, Organisms and Products Resulting from 
Synthetic Biology Techniques on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/18/INF/3 (May 20, 2014), http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings 
/sbstta/sbstta-18/information/sbstta-18-inf-03-en.pdf [http://perma.cc/VY6W-8QB9]. 
 53.  See Elfick, supra note 10. Stanford University and the University of Edinburgh have an 
ongoing research program on the artistic and aesthetic dimensions of synthetic biology, one result 
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and perhaps even spiritual54 consequences. However, except as these issues 
intersect with my particular concern to understand the legal regulation of 
innovation in this new field, I do not consider them here. Nor am I concerned with 
the regulation of biological risk, which currently occupies much of the attention 
paid to synthetic biology, particularly in interdisciplinary and policy venues.55 
Finally, I am not concerned to assess comprehensively the scientific success of the 
endeavor to date, except inasmuch as early signs of its seriousness and promise 
prove necessary to understand its legal and institutional importance. To understand 
these legal and institutional dimensions, however, it is necessary to understand at 
least the outlines of the synthetic biological project. Accordingly, I discuss in the 
first Subpart below the aim of turning biology into an engineering discipline before 
considering in the next Subpart some of the early visible successes of the field. 
A.   Biology: An Engineering Discipline? 
The early advocates of synthetic biology were familiar with standardization 
given the engineering backgrounds that many of them shared, and they hoped to 
establish similar practices in biology. As early as Tom Knight’s discussion of the 
standardization of screw threads in his presentation of the first BioBricks assembly 
standard, the historical success of standardization in the industrial economy has 
served as the point of departure for synthetic biology, and as an explicit benchmark 
 
of which was the publication of SYNTHETIC AESTHETICS, supra note  10; see also: SYNTHETIC 
AESTHETICS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.syntheticaesthetics.org [http://perma.cc/8N9K-2KC8]. 
 54.  The consequences of success in synthetic biology may even raise religious and 
theological questions, given the salvational dimensions that some religious scholars have 
identified in the ambition and rhetoric of the field. See Gaymon Bennett, Mediating Salvation: 
How SynBERC Proposed to Deliver the Promised Future of Synthetic Biology (Abstract), in 
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS’ ADVENTURES IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 7 (2012), https://www.kcl.ac.uk 
/sspp/departments/sshm/research/csynbi-PDFs/ProgrammeSocialScientistsAdventuresSB.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/RS8E-2DAB]; see also Peter Dabrock, Playing God? Synthetic Biology as a 
Theological and Ethical Challenge, 3 SYST. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 47 (2009). More generally, its 
success would bring the life sciences fully within the ambit of an instrumentalizing rationality, 
criticized by Heidegger and others in the twentieth-century as characteristic of the inhumanity 
of industrial modernity. See Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik [The Question 
Concerning Technology], Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954), translated in THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (William Lovitt trans., 1977). This is not the 
occasion to analyze the metaphysics upon which this deep criticism depends nor to defend an 
alternative conception of humanity and its teleology in which these new technologies would play 
an important role. 
 55.  On biosecurity, see NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, ADDRESSING 
BIOSECURITY CONCERNS FOR SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY (2010). See also Hans Bügl et al., DNA Synthesis 
and Biological Security, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 627 (2007); Catherine Jefferson et al., 
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: Challenging the “Myths”, FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH, Aug. 2014, 
at 115; Alexander Kelle, Ensuring the Security of Synthetic Biology—Towards a 5P Governance 
Strategy, 3 SYST. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 85 (2009). On the public apprehension of risk in this area, 
see Dan M. Kahan et al., Risk and Culture: Is Synthetic Biology Different? (GW L. Faculty Publ’n 
& Other Works, Working Paper No. 201) (2009), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty 
_publications/201/ [https://perma.cc/HS3A-D4ND]. 
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of success.56 “Making biology easier to engineer,” as Drew Endy succinctly 
articulated the ambition, would require standardization and related processes.57 
These include not only standardization, discussed at greater length below, but 
“decoupling,” meaning the reduction of complicated problems into composite 
simpler problems,58 and “abstraction,” meaning the organization of complexity into 
a hierarchy delineating principles and tasks by ontic level, which is to say different 
levels of biological organization.59 Figure 1 provides a visual illustration.60 Progress 
in these foundational tasks aims at the development of “a design and construction 
framework that makes routine the incorporation of basic biological functions into 





 56.  See discussion supra note 1. 
 57.  See Endy, supra note 2, at 449. 
 58.  Id. at 451. 
 59.  Id. (“To be useful, biological engineering abstraction hierarchies must (1) allow 
individuals to work at any one level of complexity without regard for the details that define other 
levels, yet (2) allow for the principled exchange of limited information across levels.”). Note that 
this abstraction hierarchy is predicated on a conception of the part-whole relationship, which 
might be susceptible to mereological nihilism. (It does not, however, presuppose mereological 
essentialism, since the abstraction would itself be, at least in large part, constructed as an 
ontological hierarchy.) 
 60.  Figure 1 is from Endy, supra note 2, at 451 fig.2. 
 61.  Canton et al., supra note 33, at 787. The authors note that “[m]ature engineering 
disciplines have developed similar frameworks by using the concept of abstraction to define sets 
of standardized, functional objects that can be used in combination, together with composition 
rules that specify how such objects should be assembled.” Id. Note that the theoretical foundations 
of synthetic biology—standardization, decoupling, and abstraction—may come to be of further 
use in yet grander syntheses of biology and information science, including in biosemiotics. See, 
e.g., Stephen Philip Pain, Inner Representations and Signs in Animals, in INTRODUCTION TO 
BIOSEMIOTICS 409, 441-442 (Marcello Barbieri ed., 2007) (on the adaptation of Endy’s work in 
synthetic biology to biosemiotics). 
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Figure 1: Abstraction Hierarchy for Synthetic Biology (taken from Endy, supra 
note 2, at 451). 
 
Beyond the shared interest in reliable genetic constructs, however, there is 
considerable divergence in the field, as would be expected with any emerging 
technology. Some synthetic biologists argue for a concentration on fundamentals—
a “parts” agenda focused on standardization and construction62—while others are 
moving in the direction of what is sometimes called “systems biology,” with less 
emphasis on reducing biological engineering to its foundational elements.63 As the 
historian of science Luis Campos, an observer of the field since its earliest days, 
explains, “[d]espite the deterministic implications of the metaphorical ‘emerging 
technology’ label, synthetic biology today remains a diverse collection of endeavors, 
technologies and actors. To reify and ossify such a complex social constellation 
would be to miss the phenomenon of interest entirely.”64 
Standardization nevertheless remains the most widely cited and familiar aim of 
the discipline. As one of the founders of the field, Timothy Gardner, explains, “the 
 
 62.  See Canton et al., supra note 61; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing iGEM Registry of 
Standardized Parts). 
 63.  The line between synthetic biology and systems biology is unclear; many academic 
departments group these novel approaches to biological engineering together. Arguably, systems 
biology focuses on the organization of biological systems and is thus less “reductionist” than 
synthetic biology, though the two approaches may also be seen as complementary. George M. 
Church, From Systems Biology to Synthetic Biology, 1 MOLECULAR SYS. BIOLOGY 132 (2005); 
Priscilla E.M. Purnick & Ron Weiss, The Second Wave of Synthetic Biology: From Modules to 
Systems, 10 NATURE REVS. MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 410 (2009). 
 64.  Luis Campos, The BioBrick™ Road, 7 BIOSOCIETIES 115, 116 (2012). 
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central premise of Synthetic Biology is that standardization of reusable biological 
components is the most efficient and effective way to engineer biology.”65 
Standards are pervasive in the industrial economy and can be understood as 
complex coordinative regimes that become materially embodied. As historian 
Steven Mihm notes: 
Standardization can encompass a wide range of coordinating mechanisms. These 
include uniform accounting standards; metrological standards governing units of 
measurement; technical standards defining a uniform industrial component; and 
quality standards that define various commodities. Such standards, more often 
than not, gain currency via cooperation, not competition.66 
Standards also exhibit economies of scale in their adoption by new users, a process 
I have elsewhere described as a form of power (“network power”).67 As Mihm 
argues on similar lines: “it is the cumulative acts of adoption within a community 
or network that invest standards with power as coordinating mechanisms.”68  
Standardization is thus an eminently human construction that necessarily 
occurs in a community; as two sociologists define it, it is “a process of constructing 
uniformities across time and space, through the generation of agreed-upon rules.”69 
Whether the life sciences will ultimately be able to support such constructed 
uniformities is not obvious.70 Complications include the fact that biological systems 
evolve both in space and time, are subject to unexpected interactions both within 
and without any ontic level, and may give rise to “emergent properties.”71 As the 
esteemed scientist Frances Arnold argued in 2006: “There is no such thing as a 
standard component, because even a standard component works differently 
depending on the environment . . . . The expectation that you can type in a sequence 
and can predict what a circuit will do is far from reality and always will be.”72 
Endy’s response to these complexities is indicative of the ambitions of the field: 
 
 65.  Gardner & Hawkins, supra note 10, at 872 (“[w]hile Synthetic Biology has rapidly 
catapulted itself to the status of a field, it remains fundamentally a proposition originally 
formulated by Adam Arkin and Drew Endy in a whitepaper submitted in 1999 to help DARPA 
define its Biocomputing research program.”). See also Drew Endy & Adam Arkin, A Standard 
Parts List for Biological Circuitry (1999), http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/29794 
/Arkin.Endy.DARPA.pdf?sequence=1 [http://perma.cc/E8Z9-KPEP]. 
 66.  Mihm, supra note 1, at 8. 
 67.  See generally GREWAL, supra note 1 (describing the economies of scale to the adoption 
of shared standards as constituting a form of power). 
 68.  Mihm, supra note 1, at 9. 
 69.  Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 1, at 71. 
 70.  Arti Rai, Unstandard Standardization: The Case of Biology, 53 COMM. OF THE A.C.M., 
37, 37 (2010). 
 71.  Emergent properties “emerge” at one level of systemic complexity without being 
exhibited in the parts that make up the whole. Scott D. Findlay & Paul Thagard, How Parts Make 
Up Wholes, 3 FRONTIERS IN PHYSIOLOGY 455 (2012); Alex B. Novikoff, The Concept of Integrative 
Levels and Biology, 101 SCI. 209 (1945). 
 72.  As cited in Andrew Pollack, Custom-Made Microbes, at Your Service, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/17/health/science/custommade-microbes 
-at-your-service.html [https://perma.cc/P9Y2-YUTD]. 
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“Thankfully, these concerns are best evaluated by attempting to surmount them.”73 
This response is not mere bravado, but also reflects a fundamental, if usually 
unarticulated epistemological orientation that marks the applied and experimental 
sciences: the view that practical capacity itself defines the limits of the knowable. 
As anthropologists Paul Rabinow and Gaymon Bennett put it, “post-genomics has 
seen the intensification of an engineering disposition in biology: understanding 
through making and remaking.”74 
Accumulating experimental results from the last few years suggest an 
increasing capacity to make—and, therefore to understand—reliably engineerable 
genetic constructs or “standard biological parts.” A major technical difficulty in 
synthetic biology has been achieving precision in gene expression, without which 
no sophisticated biological constructs can be expected to behave as desired. In 2013, 
a major breakthrough in controlling gene expression came with the use of 
bicistronic architecture (i.e., a two-gene design within a single vector), which 
enabled researchers to achieve 93% accuracy in predicting arbitrary gene expression 
levels.75  
The importance of the bicistronic architecture may become clearer by 
contrasting two experiments developing computational functions in engineered 
biological systems. In a 2012 study, without the use of bicistronic architecture, Endy 
and colleagues constructed a system of “rewritable” genetic data storage.76 
However, this breakthrough came only after experimentally screening over 700 
different genetic designs to find one that realized rewriteable genetic memory.77 By 
contrast, in a slightly later experiment in 2013, focused on building genetic “logic 
gates” that enable basic computational functions, Endy and colleagues used 
bicistronic architecture and other newly available standard biological parts to 
control gene expression.78 They succeeded in building genetic systems encoding six 
Boolean operations, and without the need for extensive screening, since every one 
of these genetic constructs following the newly realized genetic expression 
standards worked the first time as intended.79 Thus, about a decade after the field 
first emerged, there was now reason to believe that reusable, reliable, context-
independent standard biological parts can be developed—and become the basis for 
more sophisticated engineered biological systems. 
 
 73.  Endy, supra note 3, at 449. 
 74.  PAUL RABINOW & GAYMON BENNETT, DESIGNING HUMAN PRACTICES: AN EXPERIMENT 
WITH SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 15 (2012). They go on to explain: “The challenge for synthetic 
biologists is to take biology beyond the guild-like restrictions of artisanal savoir faire and to make 
it into a full-fledged engineering discipline, with all this entails in terms of standardization, 
modularization, and regularization.” Id. 
 75.  Vivek K. Mutalik, et al., Precise and Reliable Gene Expression via Standard 
Transcription and Translation Initiation Elements, 10 NATURE METHODS 354, 359 (2013). 
 76.  See Jerome Bonnet et al., Rewritable Digital Data Storage in Live Cells via Engineered 
Control of Recombination Directionality, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8884 (2012). 
 77.  Id. at 8886 tbl.1 (right-hand column). 
 78.  Jerome Bonnet, et al., Amplifying Genetic Logic Gates, 340 SCI. 599 (2013). 
 79.  Personal communication with Drew Endy. 
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B.   Early Successes 
In spite of recent breakthroughs, the ambition to achieve engineerable 
biological systems through standardization and associated practices remains, at the 
time of writing, mostly unrealized, with major technical challenges unresolved.80 
However, there have been some visible early successes in the endeavor, which 
suggest why the field has captured the attention of scientists and non-scientists 
alike. Two early successes in particular seem worth describing in modest detail, in 
order to reveal how private actors, networks of peers, and research scientists are 
making biology “easier to engineer.” The first is the synthetic production of the 
anti-malarial drug artemisinin. The second is the growth of the International 
Genetically Engineered Machines (iGEM) competition, which brings high school 
and college students from around the world into synthetic biology. In both 
examples, researchers have faced the problem of what legal instruments should 
govern the production and distribution of biotechnological innovation and what 
technical platforms are available to enable its open development.   
1.   Synthetic Artemisinin Production 
 One of the most visible early successes in synthetic biology is the artificial 
production of artemisinin, a medicinal product extracted from Artemisia annua 
(“sweet wormwood”), first identified by traditional healers as a remarkably effective 
treatment for malaria.81 However, the cultivation of A. annua is highly labor 
intensive, which makes the natural production of artemisinin costly.82 Moreover, 
the complex nature of the artemisinin compound makes chemical synthesis a 
challenging and undesirable target for most drug companies. Given these 
challenges, artemisinin is currently in short supply: the compound’s efficacy has led 
 
 80.  Roberta Kwok, Five Hard Truths for Synthetic Biology, 463 NATURE 288 (2010). For 
a list of relevant remaining tasks of standardization, see Andrew W. Torrance & Linda J. Kahl, 
Bringing Standards to Life: Synthetic Biology Standards and Intellectual Property, 30 SANTA 
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 199, 206-220 (2014). Note that the technical difficulties to be surmounted 
may be minor compared to the broader cultural, legal, and institutional changes required for the 
technology to succeed. 
 81.  The chemical derivatives of artemisinin constitute the leading antimalarial drug 
treatment recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE TREATMENT OF MALARIA ix (2d ed., 2010), http://apps 
.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s19105en/s19105en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VV5-4T4Y]. 
Artemisinin derivatives have replaced historic antimalarial therapies because the latter are 
compromised by increasing drug resistance. To prevent artemisinin-resistance from developing, 
the WHO has advanced the use of artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs), which use 
multiple antimalarial acting compounds, the primary constituents being artemisinin derivatives. 
Id. 
 82.  Without subsidies, ACTs are twenty to forty times more expensive than traditional 
antimalarial treatments, some of which have been compromised by the emergence of resistant 
malarial strains. See Allen Lewis Malisa & Deodatus Kiriba, Artemisinin Combination Therapies 
Price Disparity Between Government and Private Health Sectors and Its Implication on 
Antimalarial Drug Consumption Pattern in Morogoro Urban District, Tanzania, 5 BMC RES. 
NOTES 165, 165-66 (2012). 
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to calls for a 15-fold increase in production from 2004 levels to meet a global 
demand of 400 million adult malarial treatments.83 
 To fill this gap, a synthetic and systems biology group at the University of 
California, Berkeley, led by Jay Keasling, engineered a semi-synthetic means of 
producing artemisinin through engineered biological processes, with the potential 
to provide up to a third of global need, and at much lower cost.84 In partnership 
with Amyris Biotechnologies, Inc. (which Keasling co-founded), the Institute for 
One World Health, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the University of 
California, Berkeley, Keasling’s group helped engineer a production process that is 
now being used by Sanofi, a leading pharmaceutical company, to supplement the 
global supply of naturally produced artemisinin.85 This cost reduction is realized by 
mass-producing artemisinin through an S. cerevisiae (yeast) chimera comprised of 
a synthetic gene and naturally occurring S. cerevisiae, A. annua, and bacterial 
genes.86 The Keasling lab’s contribution to the synthetic gene—its reconstruction 
and optimization—employed a method now common in synthetic biology and 
widely available.87 The standardization of key methods and materials allowed for 
the conversion of a simple and relatively inexpensive input, Acetyl coenzyme A, 
into a valuable and complex chemical product.88  
 
 83.  Victoria Hale et al., Microbially Derived Artemisinin: A Biotechnology Solution to the 
Global Problem of Access to Affordable Antimalarial Drugs, 77 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 
198, 199 (2007). 
 84.  Stephan Herrera, Synthetic Biology Offers Alternative Pathways to Natural Products, 
23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 267, 270-71 (2005); see also Andrew W. Torrance, Synthesizing 
Law for Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 629, 630-32 (2010). 
 85.  See Press Release: PATH, First Antimalarial Treatments Produced with Semisynthetic 
Artemisinin Enter Market (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.path.org/news/press-room/685 
[https://perma.cc/EXY9-9EVB]. 
 86.  The biological parts that were standardized for this purpose include a genetic construct 
of eight genes, first inserted into a model organism, E. coli, and now used in S. cerevisiae. Most 
of the genes were isolated and cloned by the Keasling group. However, two of the genes and 
several pieces of facilitating genetic material—e.g., cloning vectors—were isolated by other 
laboratories and fully described in the published literature. See Vincent J.J. Martin et al., 
Engineering a Mevalonate Pathway in Escherichia coli for Production of Terpenoids, 21 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 796, 797 (2003). 
 87.  For a discussion of “codon optimization” in the Keasling lab’s work, see Anthony JR, 
Anthony LC, Nowroozi F, Kwon G, Newman JD, Keasling JD. Optimization of the Mevalonate-
Based Isoprenoid Biosynthetic Pathway in Escherichia coli for Production of the anti-Malarial 
Drug Precursor Amorpha-4,11-diene. 11 METABOLIC ENGINEERING 13 (2009). For the present 
commercial ubiquity of this technique, see, e.g., GeneArt® Gene Synthesis Codon Optimization 
Challenge, THERMO FISHER SCI., INC. (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.lifetechnologies.com/us/en 
/home/products-and-services/promotions/geneart-gene-synthesis-codon-optimization 
-challenge.html [https://perma.cc/KJQ9-3TQ8]. 
 88.  This use of synthetic biology in metabolic engineering of this kind is one of the most 
promising areas of its application. See Jay D. Keasling, Synthetic Biology and the Development 
of Tools for Metabolic Engineering, 14 METABOLIC ENGINEERING 189 (2012); Josuha K. Michener 
et al., Applications of Genetically-Encoded Biosensors for the Construction and Control of 
Biosynthetic Pathways, 14 METABOLIC ENGINEERING 212 (2012); Christina D. Smolke, et al., 
Controlling the Metabolic Flux Through the Carotenoid Pathway Using Directed mRNA 
Processing and Stabilization, 3 METABOLIC ENGINEERING  313 (2001). 
Winter 2017          OPENNESS IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 163 
 If this genetic construct proves commercially successful, it may increase 
access not just to artemisinin, but also a range of current and prospective drugs. 
The WHO has already approved the sale and use of synthetic artemisinin-based 
combination therapies as antimalarial treatments, and similar compounds are now 
being considered for synthetic production.89 Potential cost reductions depend on 
the economies of scale inherent in large-scale fermentation reactions and the 
compatibility of S. cerevisiae with this industrial-scale production method.90 Much 
remains to be seen, but the early success in metabolic engineering suggests the 
possibility of widespread and commercially viable synthetic production of a range 
of important and otherwise rare compounds.91 The synthetic production of 
artemisinin, however, has depended upon conventional patenting and 
commercialization techniques, subsidized through private philanthropy, and thus 
cannot be scaled straightforwardly for the large and relatively comprehensive 
collection of foundational standard biological parts that would be required for the 
open development of the field as a whole.92 
2.   The iGEM Competition 
 While the synthetic production of artemisinin has proceeded through a 
major industrial partnership and advanced laboratory research, a different kind of 
success is realized in the annual International Genetically Engineered Machine 
(iGEM) competition.93 iGEM is a keystone event in the synthetic biology 
 
 89.  See Chris J. Paddon & Jay D. Keasling, Semi-Synthetic Artemisinin: A Model for the 
Use of Synthetic Biology in Pharmaceutical Development, 12 NATURE REV. MICROBIOLOGY 355, 
363 (2014). Critics note that the artificial synthesis of artemisinin threatens the livelihood of 
agricultural producers of Artemisia, and possibly the supply chain for the naturally produced 
drug, if the introduction of synthetic products is not carefully sequenced. See ETC Group, 
Artemisinin and Synthetic Biology: A Case Study, (2014), http://www.etcgroup.org/sites 
/www.etcgroup.org/files/ETC-artemisinin-synbio-casestudy2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V99Y 
-3NPQ]. 
 90.  Industrial fermentation reactions are typically performed in large anaerobic digesters 
that convert simple organic matter into biomass, methane, and other gas products. These 
digesters’ use is thoroughly modeled and standardized for beer production and wastewater 
treatment. Thus, by providing a metabolic pathway that could essentially be “dropped in” to this 
organism and system, Keasling’s group has transferred the artemisinin-producing capabilities of 
A. annua firmly into the standardized realm of engineering. 
 91.  One of the most promising endeavors in this area is the biosynthetic production of 
opioids, demonstrated in Christina Smolke’s Stanford bioengineering laboratory. See Stephanie 
Galanie, et al., Complete Biosynthesis of Opioids in Yeast, 349 SCI. 1066, 1095 (2015). The 
technique has been taken into commercial development through a new synthetic biology 
company, Antheia, which aims “to make and fairly provide medicines to all who need them.” See 
ANTHEIA (Aug. 13, 2015), http://antheia.bio [https://perma.cc/R9VD-76XF]. 
 92.  On the likely prohibitive cost of patenting a feasible collection of standard biological 
parts, see infra note 171. 
 93.  For an overview, see Christina D. Smolke, Building Outside of the Box: iGEM and the 
BioBricks Foundation, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1059, 1099 (2009). See also James Brown, 
The iGEM Competition: Building with Biology, 1 IET SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 3 (2007); Cristina 
Vilanova & Manuel Porcar., iGEM 2.0—Refoundations for Engineering Biology, 32 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 397, 420-24 (2014). 
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community, bringing together college and high school students who use kits of 
standardized biological parts to create innovative biological systems. One of its 
primary goals is to develop a network of rising synthetic biologists and to instill in 
them a collaborative ethos reflective of the iGEM goals, as well as the experience of 
using shared standards and open access tools in biotechnology.94  
Held in Cambridge, Massachusetts annually since 2004, and now involving 
multiple regional competitions worldwide, each iGEM competition hosts several 
thousand students as the formal culmination of summer-long design and research 
programs.95 Past winners have subsequently produced peer-reviewed journal 
articles detailing their development of E. coli biofilms that can take pictures,96 
genetic sorting algorithms that can act like computers,97 and feedback mechanisms 
that can reduce sepsis-causing inflammation in mammalian cells.98 What is 
remarkable about these successes is their proof of concept over a very short period 
of time, usually just a few months, without professional assistance.99 In a period 
during which synthetic biology is still gaining its footing as a field, iGEM has 
demonstrated that the standardization of parts can facilitate the creation of 
biological circuitry, alternative feedback systems, and computing devices—and all 
by teams of student-amateurs working over summers.  
An important consequence of this annual event has been to draw new 
biological innovations into the Registry of Standard Biological Parts. Teams are 
provided with synthetic biological kits containing 384 wells of dried genes, vectors, 
and other genetic material—all taken from the Registry—and must in turn submit 
their entries for the competition to the Registry. The result is an expanding 
collection for future teams: the expansion of the synthetic biology commons 
achieved through an educational competition. The Registry has grown to 
 
 94.  For a description of the outcomes related to this goal, see Thiprampai Thamamongood 
et al., Cultivation of Synthetic Biology with the iGEM Competition, 17 J. ADV. COMPUTATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE 161, 163 (2013). 
 95.  In the inaugural, inter-collegiate competition held the following year, five universities 
fielded teams. Over the following nine years, more than a hundred universities from twenty-six 
countries participated in the iGEM competition. In 2014, the grand prize-winners and runners 
up were from Heidelberg University (Germany), Imperial College (United Kingdom), and 
National Chiao Tung University (Taiwan), respectively, with University of California, Davis, 
winning the grand prize in the “overgraduate” (i.e., older student) category. See Torrance, supra 
note 84, at 630-32 (discussing the several IGEM competitions, including the prize-winning 
entries). 
 96. Anselm Levskaya et al., Synthetic Biology: Engineering Escherichia coli to See Light, 
438 NATURE 441, 441 (2005) (altering E. coli function by insertion of cyanobacteria color-
producing genes). The authors infer that the technology can be further advanced for use in 
biologic printing or investigating cell signaling. Id. 
 97.  Jordan Baumgardner et al., Solving a Hamiltonian Path Problem with a Bacterial 
Computer, 3 J. BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING 11 (2009); Karmella Haynes et al., Engineering Bacteria 
to Solve the Burnt Pancake Problem, 2 J. BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING 8 (2008). 
 98.  Monika Ciglič et al., Engineered Human Cells: Say No to Sepsis, 1 IET SYNTHETIC 
BIOLOGY 13, 13 (2007). 
 99.  Indeed, the first peer-review iGEM publications (2005-2009) were generated shortly 
after the founding of the project (2003-2004). 
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encompass more than twenty thousand discrete genetic sequences and circuits, 
largely as a result of the iGEM competition. 
As with any open-source system, the iGEM competition faces challenges of 
quality control and maintaining standardization across decentralized endeavors. 
Recognizing the necessity of standardized parts for such a community, iGEM 
pushed for early standardization, which met dissent from research groups that had 
developed their own standards.100 More than divergent standards, however, the 
low quality of many parts has often frustrated projects: in 2008, 45% of survey 
respondents indicated that poor-quality parts were a major detriment to their 
work.101 The variable quality of parts is well known in the iGEM community: the 
first competition demonstrated to organizers that more commercial-grade DNA 
vectors, greater standardization of parts, and a better developed sense of 
engineering abstraction and hierarchy were needed to create successful projects.102 
Along with the lack of a suite of reliable standard biological parts, another 
complexity for the iGEM competition has been the legal ambiguity around the 
standardized parts in the Registry, given the lack of any prevalent open-licensing 
scheme in biotechnology.103  
These challenges notwithstanding, iGEM provides an example of the promise 
of synthetic biology. In terms of community building and education, the 
competition remains perhaps the major gateway for new generations of synthetic 
biologists. In technical terms, iGEM continues to improve, as the peer-reviewed 
publications that have come out of recent iGEM projects demonstrate. Recent 
winners show greater sophistication in deploying new standards of genetic 
assembly,104 circuit possibilities,105 and cell-interaction patterns106 that advance 
beyond familiar biological constructs to novel computational and metabolic 
processes. But the future success of iGEM may be hampered by the lack of a legal 
framework enabling the sharing of standard biological parts once winning projects 
move out of academia and into the conventional biotechnology sector, where 
openness and standardization continue to be unfamiliar and often resisted. 
 
 100.  See Smolke, supra note 93, at 1100. 
 101.  Rudolph Mitchell et al., Experiential Engineering Through iGEM—An Undergraduate 
Summer Competition in Synthetic Biology, 20 J. SCI. EDUC. TECH. 156, 160 (2011). 
 102.  See Smolke, supra note 93, at 1099. 
 103.  While iGEM has very sensibly relied on the de facto “research exemption,” given that 
its participants are all students, and most do not produce innovations that are plausibly 
commercializable, it has also been a strong supporter of the BioBricks Foundation’s efforts to 
develop new legal instruments for open synthetic biology. The BPA, discussed infra Part III.C, is 
now used by many iGEM teams. 
 104.  Shotaro Ayukawa et al., Construction of a Genetic AND Gate Under a New Standard 
for Assembly of Genetic Parts, 11 BMCGENOMICS S16, S16 (2010); Robert Conrado et al., DNA-
Guided Assembly of Biosynthetic Pathways Promotes Improved Catalytic Efficiency, 40 NUCLEIC 
ACIDS RES. 1879, 1879 (2011). 
 105.  Chunbo Lou, et al., Synthesizing a Novel Genetic Sequential Logic Circuit: A Push-on 
Push-off Switch, 6 SYS. BIOLOGY 350, 350 (2010). 
 106.  Chenli Liu et al., Sequential Establishment of Stripe Patterns in an Expanding Cell 
Population, 334 SCI. 238, 238 (2011). 
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III.   ‘OPEN SOURCE’ SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
When Drew Endy called for “vibrant, open research communities”107 to lead 
the development of synthetic biology, his appeal was made in recognition of the 
success of open technological development elsewhere in the information economy. 
His call was predicated on the hope that “open source”-style legal and institutional 
arrangements could govern the future growth of synthetic biology as well. In this 
appeal, the example of free or open source software (F/OSS) loomed especially 
large.108  
The aim of Endy and his colleagues is the realization in synthetic biology of 
what has been called “commons-based peer production,”109 forms of creative 
endeavor in which communities of innovators share foundational resources—ideas, 
practices, technologies—and collectively accomplish what none of them can 
individually. This kind of peer production is sought in synthetic biology both for 
intrinsic reasons, given the character of the creative freedom and scientific 
collegiality it is thought to promote, as well as for instrumental ones. In the latter 
vein, the anticipated synthetic biology revolution was understood by its early 
advocates to be beyond the capacity of even exceptionally talented individuals to 
produce single-handedly. It would thus require an entire scientific community 
dedicated to the task. Synthetic biologists accordingly sought to adopt the strategy 
employed by other open collaborative communities, most famously in F/OSS 
production, in which it has been shown that, “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are 
shallow,”110 to cite what has been dubbed “Linus’s Law.” The early establishment of 
 
 107.  See Endy, supra note 2, at 449. 
 108.  See Arti Rai & James Boyle, Synthetic Biology: Caught Between Property Rights, the 
Public Domain, and the Commons, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 389, 391 (2007) (“The idea of a synthetic 
biology commons draws inspiration, in part, from the prominence of the open source software 
model as an alternative to proprietary software.”); see also Torrance, supra note 84, at 653-54 
(“[T]he troika most responsible for the BBF and the iGEM competition [Endy, Knight, and 
Rettberg] came to the field [of] biology from a background in engineering and computer 
science . . . . The origins of the open source philosophy [in synthetic biology] lie within the 
computer software community.”). For a discussion of the analogies and disanalogies of “open 
source biotech” and F/OSS, see Alan G. Isaac & Walter G. Park, Open Development: Is the ‘Open 
Source’ Analogy Relevant to Biotechnology?, in THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 225, 241-42 (David Castle ed., 2009). 
 109.  Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 23, at 375. See infra Part IV.C for a more 
extensive discussion of the concept. 
 110.  The “law” is named after Linus Torvalds of Linux fame. It was articulated famously in 
Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSING 
ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 27, 30 (1999). For a concise 
description of how this works in F/OSS production, see Paul Vixie, Software Engineering, in 
OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 91, 98-99 (1999), observing that 
“[a]n additional advantage enjoyed by open-source projects is the ‘peer review’ of dozens or 
hundreds of other programmers looking for bugs by reading the source code rather than just by 
executing packaged executables.” Note that the ambition to develop a community of synthetic 
biologists similar to the community of digital hackers raises potential biosafety problems that I 
do not address in this article. See supra note 55 on biosecurity generally. These concerns have 
become most acute in relation to the nascent community of “DIY Bio”—”Do-it-yourself 
biologists” or bio-hackers—whose relation to the mainstream of primarily university-based 
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iGEM was not simply for its scientific or pedagogical value, but part of a campaign 
to induct a cadre of future scientists who would take such open collaboration for 
granted.111 
It remains unclear, however, how best to instill the norms of open 
collaboration and reciprocity that characterize successful communities of peer 
production in other domains. It is also unclear what contribution legal strategies 
can make in this effort. From early in the emergence of the field, Endy and other 
founders of the BBF enlisted lawyers and legal scholars to help analyze the 
intellectual property laws governing synthetic biology, conscious of the role that 
the GNU General Public License (GPL) had played in the Free Software 
movement.112 The First International Meeting on Synthetic Biology (SB 1.0), 
which took place in 2004 at MIT, had a panel discussion on “biological property 
rights” in an otherwise tightly-targeted scientific agenda.113 An important early 
workshop in 2007, jointly organized by MIT and the Duke Center for Public 
Genomics, resulted in a careful mapping of the intellectual property landscape with 
respect to synthetic biology.114 Over the following five years, the BBF worked with 
a range of attorneys and legal scholars, notably at Duke, Berkeley,115 Yale,116 and 
Stanford Law Schools.117 The most crucial legal assistance came when Mark 
Fischer, a Boston-based attorney with several decades’ experience working on 
intellectual property, including drafting open source licenses, began working 
intensively with the BBF on a pro bono basis.118 
 
synthetic biology remains ambiguous. See, e.g., Campos, supra note 37, at 344-45 (on Endy’s 
changing relation to the DIY movement). For a journalistic account of DIY biology, see MARCUS 
WOHLSEN, BIOPUNK: DIY SCIENTISTS HACK THE SOFTWARE OF LIFE (2011). 
 111.  Personal communications with Drew Endy and Randy Rettberg. 
 112.  For the current version of the GPL, see GNU General Public License, GNU OPERATING 
SYS. (June 29, 2007), https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html [https://perma.cc/9FCA 
-86K7]. For a history of discussions of intellectual property law in early synthetic biology 
workshops and conferences emphasizing “granular description” and analyzing personal 
interactions as key to understanding the orientation to intellectual property, see Campos, supra 
note 64. 
 113.  MIT, The First International Meeting on Synthetic Biology (2004), 
http://openwetware.org/images/7/79/SB1.0_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/629J-LAGC]. 
Note that all subsequent SB meetings have included a component on “human practices,” including 
the legal, institutional and social issues surrounding intellectual property. 
 114.  See Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, and an elaboration in Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, 
Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745 (2007). 
 115.  At Berkeley Law School’s Samuelson Clinic, in addition to Pam Samuelson, the BBF 
benefited from the help of Jason Schultz, Jennifer Lynch, and a team of clinical students. 
 116.  I have served as a Director of the BioBricks Foundation since 2009. My involvement 
with the BioBricks Foundation first began through discussions with Drew Endy when he was at 
MIT and I was a graduate student (and later a Junior Fellow) at Harvard University, continuing 
into my current appointment at Yale Law School. 
 117.  Endy is now based at Stanford Bioengineering and has organized conferences with 
Stanford Law School. See Symposium Tackles Intellectual Property Challenges for Synthetic 
Biology, NSF ENGINEERING RES. CTRS. (May 14, 2017,) http://erc-assoc.org/achievements 
/symposium-tackles-intellectual-property-challenges-synthetic-biology [https://perma.cc 
/LVR2-GPT3]. 
 118.  Mark Fischer had worked in the early 1980s with free software pioneer Richard 
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Ten years after the first discussion of these issues at SB 1.0, we are now in a 
better position to assess the progress made toward peer production in synthetic 
biology, along with the value of different legal strategies employed to that end. In 
this Part, I analyze recent legal efforts to achieve “open source” synthetic biology. I 
focus particularly on the work of the BBF, not only because I was personally 
involved with it,119 but also because, as Luis Campos explains, “IP concerns in 
synthetic biology . . . initially emerged out of a complex ecology of practices 
surrounding BioBricks.”120 
To put this experiment in open synthetic biology in context, I begin in the first 
Subpart below by introducing the intellectual property law governing 
biotechnology. In the next, I consider the effort to produce a “copyleft” analogue for 
the domain of synthetic biology, arguing that the model of F/OSS has ultimately 
proved difficult to adapt to synthetic biology. I conclude in the final Subpart by 
examining the “public domain” approach realized in the BioBrick™ Public 
Agreement (BPA), the first open legal tool in synthetic biology. 
A.   Intellectual Property in Synthetic Biology 
The early successes in the field have raised the question of how synthetic 
biology is to be governed with respect to intellectual property. While I discuss 
“open source” approaches to distributing synthetic biological innovations in the 
second and third sections below, it is important to situate these against the 
conventional treatment of biotechnology within intellectual property law.121 
 Since Diamond v. Chakrabarty affirmed the patentability of a microbe that 
metabolized crude oil, the U.S. patent system has invited patenting of living 
organisms, provided they are “not nature’s handiwork,” but reflect genetic 
modifications (proving the “result of human ingenuity”).122 Above the microbial 
level, showing such ingenuity would require relatively precise genetic 
modifications of multi-cellular organisms, as occurred less than a decade after 
Chakrabarty with the Harvard “Oncomouse,” the world’s first patented, transgenic, 
multi-cellular organism.123 In the United States, at least, the general rule has been 
 
Stallman on the drafting of GNU Emacs License, the immediate precursor to the GPL v.1. See 
Williams, supra note 18, at 124 (noting Fischer’s involvement with the drafting of the GNU 
Emacs license). Fischer’s involvement with the BBF began in 2008, when Drew Endy asked him 
to help develop new legal tools that would catalyze the synthetic biology community, and ended 
with Fischer’s death in early 2015. For a discussion of his work with the BBF, see Campos, supra 
note 64. 
 119.  See supra note 116 on my involvement. 
 120.  Campos, supra note 64, at 116. 
 121.  My focus in this Part concerns mainly American intellectual property law. For a partial 
corrective to this parochialism, see Ralf Perrey & Konstanze Lenhard, Recent Developments in 
the Patentability of Inventions Relating to Medicine, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology 
According to European Patent Practice, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 479 (2007) 
(discussing struggles over ordre publique gene patents abroad). 
 122.  447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980). 
 123.  U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). Harvard researchers developed the 
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to conduct a case-by-case patent review to determine the patentability of transgenic 
organisms.124 Below the microbial level, the patenting of cellular parts, including 
genetic material, is now very widespread, if controversial. For example, there are 
many patents on synthetic DNA strands that satisfy the basic requirements of U.S. 
patent law.125  
There has been ongoing debate in many jurisdictions as to whether isolated 
genetic material should be patentable—that is, whether the mere refinement of 
naturally occurring material is a sufficient alteration for it to be considered the 
product of human ingenuity.126 Absent bright-line indicators in the U.S. federal 
patent statute, Judge Learned Hand’s rule in Parke-Davis v. Mulford has served as 
a widely influential, although contested, authority, holding that isolation and 
purification of naturally occurring material can constitute novelty.127 Parke-Davis 
was cited with great frequency in the second half of the 20th century, but its 
historical circumstances and uncertain precedential value belie a simple application 
of this rule—perhaps particularly as biotechnology has progressed.128  
The legal treatment of expressly altered genetic material became much clearer 
under the compromise rule recently established in Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.129 In that 2013 case, the Supreme Court held that 
 
cancer-susceptible mouse through a modification to activate an oncogene increasing mammary 
tumors (for use in testing). DuPont later owned the patent, which expired in 2005. See generally 
Douglas Hanahan, Erwin Wagner and Richard Palmiter, The Origins of Oncomice: A History of 
the First Transgenic Mice Genetically Engineered to Develop Cancer, 21 GENES & DEV. 2258 
(2007) for a history of oncomice in cancer research. For a background to the Harvard patent, see 
id. at 2267-68. The patentability of a genetically engineered multi-cellular organism was 
controversial, with significant delays or reversals of the patent in Canada and the European 
Community. See Adam Inch, European Patent Convention: A Moral Roadblock to 
Biotechnological Innovation in Europe, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 203, 217-19 (2007); Teresa Scassa, A 
Mouse Is a Mouse Is a Mouse: A Comment on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision on the 
Harvard Mouse Patent, 3 OX. UNIV. COMM. L.J. 105, 105 (2003). 
 124.  See Jerzy Koopman, The Patentability of Transgenic Animals in the United States of 
America and the European Union: A Proposal for Harmonization, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 103, 123-132 (2002) (providing an overview of the patenting of transgenic 
animals in US law). 
 125.  Some transgenic life forms have been found to meet the non-obviousness, novelty, and 
not previously disclosed requirements under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2012). One of the more 
famous of these engineered life forms is Mycoplasma laboratorium, produced by the Venter 
Institute and awarded U.S. Patent No. 20,070,122,826 A1; see also Move over Dolly. Synthia Is 
on Her Way, ECONOMIST (June 14, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9333408 
[https://perma.cc/A573-FQNA]. 
 126.  According to some scholars, the confusion began with Parke-Davis which upheld a 
patent on a refined but naturally occurring substance, adrenaline. See, e.g., Christopher 
Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 257 (2013) (on the 
history of that patent and Judge Learned Hand’s role in articulating its rationale). 
127. 189 F. 95, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). On 
the enduring and controversial legacy of Parke-Davis, see Beauchamp, supra note 126, at 296-
310. 
 128.  Beauchamp, supra note 126, at 305-310 (considering the complexities of the Parke-
Davis rule as it applies to biotechnology, and in anticipation of the Myriad case). 
 129.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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genetically isolated DNA (“gDNA”) is not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but that 
complementary DNA fragments (“cDNA”) are, assuming they meet the other 
relevant criteria.130 The distinction was based on a reading of the statute as 
implicitly excluding “natural phenomena”131 along with a determination that 
gDNA is the unaltered product of nature while cDNA is a synthetic creation.132 
The Myriad opinion provides little guidance to district courts in applying these 
principles beyond the specific determinations regarding gDNA and cDNA, thus 
leaving them to grapple with complexities concerning the patentability of isolated 
but unaltered products and the extent of alteration required to constitute a non-
natural product.133 For example, the distinction may leave open patenting 
opportunities for DNA sequences that are altered only slightly from the natural 
sequence, provided they meet the ambiguous standard of “marked difference” 
established by the USPTO and satisfy other tests, such as utility and non-
obviousness.134 
For synthetic biologists, Myriad nevertheless makes clear that the enterprise of 
engineering living matter will be a patentable one from the foundational practice 
of assembling standardized genetic parts all the way up through the production of 
microbial, plant, and animal organisms from those parts. In all likelihood, as several 
scholars have noted, the Myriad decision will likely incentivize further research in 
synthetic biology owing to its emphasis on alteration.135 Importantly, under 
current patent law, “making biology easier to engineer” will mean making life easier 
to own. The engineered modifications that interest synthetic biologists require just 
the sort of “human ingenuity” that will change something given by nature into 
something available for proprietary intellectual property. This fact poses numerous 
ethical complexities concerning the commodification of life,136 which are not the 
 
 130.  See id. at 2117 (finding that “separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material 
is not an act of invention”). 
 131.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) 
(noting that the Court has “long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception. 
‘[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.”) (quoting Diamond 
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981))). 
 132.  While the cDNA sequence is given by nature, these patentable sequences are altered in 
the sense that they are redacted versions of naturally occurring DNA. 
 133.  See Tup Ingram, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.: The 
Product of Nature Doctrine Revisited, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 385, 416 (2014). 
 134.  See Alex Boguniewicz, Discovering the Undiscoverable: Patient Eligibility of DNA and 
the Future of Biotechnical Patent Claims Post-Myriad, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 35, 49 (2014). 
 135.  See Torrance, supra note 84, at 640 (writing before Myriad but anticipating a change 
in the reliance on Parke-Davis: “[O]pposition to gene patents as products of nature would 
incentivize preferential investment treatment in research, development, and patenting of 
synthetic genes”). 
 136.  See Jane Calvert, The Commodification of Emergence, 3 BIOSOCIETIES 383 (2008); see 
also sources cited infra notes 153-154 on the commodification of the research universities. From 
my discussions, it seems clear that some synthetic biologists seek an alternative to proprietary 
ownership through the “open” development of the field owing in part to ambivalence about the 
way that their endeavor might change basic values concerning social solidarity and the place of 
the natural world, particularly if directed by commercial pressures. 
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focus of this Article, but which might be at least partly abated through the open 
development of the field. 
Perhaps the main concern motivating the commitment to openness among the 
early founders of synthetic biology was not commodification as much as a worry 
that the IP-centric practices of conventional biotechnology would inhibit its 
development. Some of these early innovators came to the ambition of “making 
biology easier to engineer” not only with the success of F/OSS in their personal and 
professional experience, but with the memory of seeing fights over intellectual 
property prove an inhibition to innovation in other technical domains.137 Their 
anxiety about the role of intellectual property often seemed to reflect an engineer’s 
frustration with lawyers and their inhibitory role in corporate decision-making 
around technology.138 Under the regime established in Myriad, we should expect 
synthetic biology to come under further pressure from these IP-centric practices. 
This concern to maintain openness reflects the increasingly well-documented 
claim that strong intellectual property protections can prove counterproductive to 
the production and diffusion of innovation, particularly in emerging 
technologies.139 As Arti Rai and James Boyle explain, “[c]onsiderable historical 
evidence, including evidence from virtually every important industry of the 20th 
century, suggests that broad patents on foundational research can slow growth in 
the industry.”140 Rai and Boyle note that the problem is particularly acute in 
synthetic biology, which puts into stark relief “a difficulty that the law has 
 
 137.  During our interactions while both serving as members of the BBF board, Randy 
Rettberg, the director of the iGEM competition and an early advocate of the open development 
of synthetic biology, vividly recounted to me how, in his former career as an engineer in a large 
Silicon Valley firm, he watched lawyers from competing technology companies measure the 
height of stacks of patents to be exchanged in complex cross-licensing arrangements. The effect 
of these arrangements was to maintain the market share of a small number of established, IP-
intensive firms and lock out competition from dynamic, emerging enterprises. 
 138.  Stories of the kind discussed supra note 137 were common in my interactions with 
synthetic biologists and may reflect a general division of professional training and fiduciary duty 
between lawyers and engineers. Since lawyers serve as fiduciaries for existing parties, they 
necessarily work with present interests in mind and accept the status quo as a normatively 
legitimate baseline. By contrast, the scientists and engineers with whom I have interacted have a 
future-oriented and technologically driven sense of the present as a baseline to be overcome, and 
of status quo interests as presumptively illegitimate, at least wherever they appear to inhibit the 
realization of technological innovation. 
 139.  See Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, The Problem of Patent Thickets in Convergent 
Technologies, 1093 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 180, 181-85 (2006); Richard C. Levin, et al., 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 786-88 (1987); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On Limiting or 
Encouraging Rivalry in Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, 25 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1994); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 916 (1990). As an empirical analysis shows, patents increase 
in value as they cover more foundational materials in industries that are more competitive—that 
is, consistent with theory, they are more valuable when they enable more deviation from market 
discipline. See Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, 25 RAND 
J. ECON. 319, 319 (1994); see also Isaac & Park, supra note 108, at 232-34 (discussing patent 
thickets, patents on research tools, and the ‘anti-commons’ effect as they affect biotechnology). 
 140.  Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, at 390. 
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frequently faced over the last 30 years—the assimilation of a new technology into 
the conceptual limits posed by existing intellectual property rights,” specifically, the 
anxiety that the limits of existing law “would impede the potential of the 
technology.”141 For example, patents on foundational technologies can act as what 
Carl Shapiro calls “blocking patents,” which he analogizes to control over the 
building blocks of a pyramid (in which lower-down blocks must be set before 
succeeding ones).142 Monopoly control of such technologies can inhibit 
downstream product innovation. 
In synthetic biology, this concern about the patenting of foundational advances 
that become obstacles to later development is not merely hypothetical. Recall that 
the breakthrough of “bicistronic architecture” to advance reliably genetic constructs 
was put to early use in developing computational functions in engineered biological 
systems.143 This promising line of research aims at the possibility of 
“programmable cells,” akin to operating systems for personal computers.144 
However, several years before these foundational technical advances were made, a 
very broad patent covering “molecular computing elements” was granted to the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services for an unrelated innovation.145 The 
patent reads so broadly that it “would seem effectively to patent the basic functions 
of computing when implemented [through] genetic means.”146 
In addition to blocking patents, another major concern, particularly for an 
emerging field, is the proliferation of patents with overlapping or confusing claims 
that inhibit innovation by generating legal ambiguity concerning the use or 
development of a technology. Shapiro famously called this circumstance a “patent 
thicket,” defining it as “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that 
a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
technology.”147 Rai and Boyle note that, “in the area of information technology, 
there is evidence that patent thickets or ‘anti-commons’ create difficulties for 
subsequent researchers above and beyond those created by foundational 
patents,”148 a circumstance created by the fact that “many products in information 
technology represent combinations of dozens, if not hundreds, of patented 
 
 141.  Id. at 389. 
 142.  See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 120 (2001). 
 143.  See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. 
 144.  Marcia Stone, “Transcriptors,” Reliable Parts—Gateway to Programmable Cells?, 
8 MICROBE MAG. 272, 272-73 (2013). 
 145.  U.S. Patent No. 6,774,222 (issued Aug. 10, 2004) (discussed in Rai & Boyle, supra note 
108, at 390, and in Kumar & Rai, supra note 114, at 1752 n.41). 
 146.  Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, at 390. As Rai and Boyle suggest further, the reluctance of 
the Federal Circuit to allow unwritten knowledge in the determination of the nonobviousness 
threshold presents a further problem given the informal collaborations and domain-specific 
background knowledge in emerging fields—and is perhaps particularly acute when the “reduction 
to practice” is ambiguous. Id. 
 147.  See Shapiro, supra note 142, at 120. 
 148.  Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, at 390. 
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parts.”149 The problem is already apparent in biotechnology around key biological 
parts. For example, the green fluorescent protein widely used to report gene 
expression150 is now subject to overlapping and complex patent claims now 
managed through a corporate patent pool.151 Such patent thickets are likely to 
become denser and more widespread as the field of synthetic biology matures.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the gulf between a proprietary intellectual 
property regime and the “peer production” of the research universities is more acute 
for synthetic biologists today than for earlier waves of innovators. Consider, by 
contrast, the relative freedom of those involved in the development of Unix, 
TCP/IP and related interfaces and networking protocols in the early decades of 
computing.152 Synthetic biology must develop against the backdrop of increasing 
commercialization in the research universities, which reflects several trends, 
including the prodigious growth of university endowments and a resulting 
reorientation to STEM disciplines that both use these funds and, via licensing of 
university intellectual property, contribute disproportionately to them;153 the 
growth of technology licensing offices as part of university resource policy;154 
evolutions in law that facilitate patenting higher up in the research chain;155 and 
the continued impact of the Bayh-Dole Act, with its mandate for the 
 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Roger Y. Tsien, The Green Fluorescent Protein, 67 ANN. REV. BIOCHEMISTRY 509 
(1998). 
 151.  The complex and overlapping patent claims surrounding GFP were solved—albeit 
through corporate monopolization—through the creation of a patent pool controlled by GE 
Healthcare; however, there is no reason to think that all patent thickets will be solved as easily. 
On the GFP patent pool (called AvGFP), see Birgit Verbeure, Patent Pooling for Gene-Based 
Diagnostic Testing, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 3, 18-19 (Geertrui 
Van Overwalle ed., 2009). For the BBF’s solution to this problem, see infra note 197 and 
accompanying text (discussing how “free fluorescent proteins” contributed to public domain via 
the BPA). 
 152.  See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 20-53 (2004) (on the early history 
of open computing). 
 153.  On the commercialization of academic research, see Hans Radder, The 
Commodification of Academic Research, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH: 
SCIENCE AND THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 1 (Hans Radder ed., 2010). 
 154.  On the licensing and patent strategies employed in the commercialization of academic 
science, see Sigrid Sterckx, Knowledge Transfer from Academia to Industry through Patenting 
and Licensing: Rhetoric and Reality, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH: SCIENCE 
AND THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 44 (Hans Radder ed., 2010). Note that Stanford University presents 
an interesting and important exception—and valuable template—in explicitly allowing its faculty 
to decide whether to introduce an innovation into the public domain in lieu of patenting. See 
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, RESEARCH POLICY HANDBOOK 9.1.A.3 (2016), https://doresearch.stanford 
.edu/policies/research-policy-handbook/intellectual-property/inventions-patents-and 
-licensing [https://perma.cc/R3R9-APXK] (“The inventors, acting collectively where there is 
more than one, are free to place their inventions in the public domain if they believe that would 
be in the best interest of technology transfer and if doing so is not in violation of the terms of any 
agreements that supported or related to the work.”) 
 155.  Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998). 
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commercialization of publicly-funded academic research.156 Moreover, 
conventional biotechnology is both more concentrated (i.e., oligopolistic) and more 
IP-centric than many other sectors, with patent fights an established part of firm 
strategy.157 Perhaps no group of previous researchers in history would have had as 
much reason to question intellectual property and its role in their endeavor as the 
early founders of synthetic biology, working on new biotechnologies inside the 
highly commercialized research universities of the 1990s and 2000s, but with a 
shared background in F/OSS. It is laudable but unsurprising, then, that a concern 
to maintain “openness” has been at the forefront of the field from its first days. 
B.   Copyleft: A Flawed Analogy? 
  The question for the founders of synthetic biology was thus not whether 
but how to try to maintain “openness,” particularly as the field matured and began 
to move from government and university research labs into corporate contexts. 
The first puzzle was what openness should mean in the context of biological 
innovation, which cycled around two main views. The first and most basic ideal 
was that a biological part should be “free to use”—that is, its use by a scientist or 
engineer would not constitute an infringement of intellectual property rights nor 
bring with it any other formal legal obstacles.158 This ideal of a biological part being 
“free” focused on legal rights, not the sharing of non-legal costs. For example, the 
practice of charging reasonable fees for the shipping of biological materials (when 
a physical sample is required) is common, consistent with the Universal Biological 
Materials Transfer Agreement,159 and would not violate the ideal of “free to use” in 
the way that charging fees for the use of the intellectual property would.160  
 The complexity here comes—just as it has in the debate over “free” and 
“open source” software (including “free” versus “open source” software)161—in how 
 
 156.  The effect of the Bayh-Dole Act on commercialization and university research 
priorities remains unclear. For a critical assessment, see Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-
Dole: If We Knew Then What We Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 320 (2006), and for 
an overview by the National Research Council of the National Academies of the Bayh-Dole Act’s 
effect on university research and the public interest, see MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011). 
 157.  See Oriel, supra note 11, on patents and business strategy. 
 158.  Frequently Asked Questions, BIOBRICKS FOUND., https://biobricks.org/bpa/faq/#8 
[https://perma.cc/3THF-NZ3E]. 
 159.  See Nat’l Inst. of Health, Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement § 15 (1995), 
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not95-116.html [https://perma.cc/ZQD4 
-HN6U] (“The MATERIAL is provided at no cost, or with an optional transmittal fee solely to 
reimburse the PROVIDER for its preparation and distribution costs.”) 
 160.  More generally, as a study of open biology suggests, “[a] standard is called ‘free and 
open’ when any party is licensed to read and implement it without payment. This is usually 
understood to imply an open standards process, structured to circumscribe the market power of 
specific vendors or groups.” Alan G. Isaac & Walter G. Park, Open Development: Is the “Open 
Source” Analogy Relevant to Biotechnology?, in THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 225, 236 (David Castle ed., 2009). 
 161.  On the practical and symbolic importance of this terminological contrast, see Richard 
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to treat “derivative” products or downstream developments that build on 
foundational or upstream “free to use” technologies.162 It is relatively 
straightforward to accept that a user should only be “free to use” an innovation 
consistent with its being maintained for free use on the same terms by others. But 
is this freedom realized—or abrogated—when a freely used part is used to construct 
a larger system that is not offered to others on the same terms? And what form of 
legal governance should—or could—deliver one or the other of these outcomes? 
In an early paper on the legal governance of synthetic biology, Rai and Boyle 
examined the methods by which different forms of openness could be conceived 
and legally pursued in synthetic biology. They noted that synthetic biology raised 
“an issue that has seemed of only theoretical interest until now—the tension 
between different methods of creating ‘openness.’”163 They distinguished a 
“commons” and a “public domain” strategy for the open development of a field, and 
argued that the case of synthetic biology was difficult to fit into existing open-
source practice.  
The “commons” strategy is the most familiar: it relies on intellectual property 
law to safeguard and expand a collection of shared resources. This strategic use of 
intellectual property law meant for proprietary purposes is often called a “hack”—
understood in this instance to mean a clever repurposing—as seen in the “copyleft” 
arrangements undergirding the success of GPL in F/OSS.164 As Rai and Boyle 
explain, “[c]ertain types of open source licenses also have a ‘commons-expanding’ 
aspect: these ‘copyleft’ licenses not only make source code freely available, but they 
also require those who distribute improvements to the source code to make the 
improvements available on the same terms.”165 Adapting this model to synthetic 
biology would mean finding a way to deploy intellectual property law to protect 
biological innovations, which would then be distributed under terms that would 
advance non-proprietary ends via proprietary means. It would require that 
derivative products be licensed on the same terms that any “free-to-use” parts were 
obtained, the model here being the “share-alike” provision of the GPL. 
The synthetic biologists involved with the BBF were initially drawn to this 
model of openness, with the GPL providing the exemplar of a legal innovation 
protecting a shared commons.166 Their hope was to create a synthetic biology 
“commons,” for which the Registry of Standard Parts used by the iGEM teams and 
others served as a model. However, the options available to synthetic biologists 
looking to repurpose existing intellectual property law to generate such a commons 
proved much less promising than in the case of F/OSS. When copyright was 
 
Stallman, Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software, GNU OPERATING SYS., 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.en.html [https://perma.cc 
/8V2Q-M8WQ]. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, at 389. 
 164.  GNU General Public License, supra note 112; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 18,  
at 128-29. 
 165.  Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, at 391. 
 166.  Personal communication with Drew Endy and others. 
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extended to software in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it created legal obstacles to 
sharing that prompted Richard Stallman to declare that “charging money for 
software was a crime against humanity”167 and to release “free” software first under 
the GNU Emacs license and later the GPL.168 But a copyleft analogue has proven 
much harder to develop in biotechnology, in spite of the inspiration it provided to 
the scientists pursuing the open development of synthetic biology. 
The first and most important obstacle is that the “commons-expanding” 
strategy requires using existing intellectual property rights for leverage with respect 
to derivative works.169 In a field currently governed by patents rather than 
copyright, the BBF board first considered whether patent licensing could be used 
to promote open-source synthetic biology. Unlike copyright, which affixes 
automatically and costlessly, patenting is expensive, laborious, and non-trivial 
(requiring the specification of claims covering the scope of protection). Any 
obvious analogy from “copyleft” to some version of “patent-left” breaks down at this 
point, though the ideal of a “commons-expanding” strategy remains possible, if 
costly.  
To pursue such a strategy, advocates of openness in synthetic biology would 
need either to identify a few core innovations (parts or, more likely, assembly 
standards) that could prove foundational for the field—and which, if patented, 
would provide the basis for a “commons-expanding” patent license, or else to go to 
the expense and trouble of patenting many individual parts. The first approach of 
trying to patent a few core technologies was considered by the BBF board to violate 
the principle of openness, both by setting a bad example for corporate actors 
without the same values and also by risking an unintended inhibition of the field in 
terms of its commercial development, which would need to be able to scale across 
both for-profit and non-profit sectors.170 The second approach of trying to patent 
a sufficient assemblage of parts which could then be licensed to others on 
 
 167.  WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 85. 
 168.  On the origin of the GNU Emacs, see id. at 77-88, and on the drafting of the GNU 
Emacs license, see id. at 123-43. That license, the precursor to the later GPL, was drafted once 
Stallman decided to work through the changing intellectual property landscape, and in discussion 
with Mark Fischer. As Fischer recalls, “‘Richard had very strong views about how it should work,’ 
Fischer says, ‘He had two principles. The first was to make the software absolutely as open as 
possible. The second was to encourage others to adopt the same licensing practices.’” Id. at 124. 
 169.  As Rai and Boyle note, “[c]opylefted software relies heavily on the existence of property 
rights—specifically, copyright in the source code.” Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, at 391. 
 170.  For example, given a foundational patent on a few key parts or processes, the BBF 
could attempt “commons expansion” under a share-alike licensing provision of one kind or 
another. But how it would require licensees to treat their own innovations remained unclear, 
with no obviously attractive solution. If patenting of these new parts (and release on the same 
terms of the BBF’s patent) were required, this demand would represent a large expenditure, given 
the costs of patenting, and thus slow the growth of a peer community, while also consolidating 
both larger firms and the IP-centric nature of biotechnology. If patenting was not required—or 
indeed precluded—on the terms of the original license, it would set up familiar incentive problems 
by making it difficult to commercialize synthetic biological applications, which would make initial 
venture funding difficult to obtain, which would similarly slow the development of the field given 
the large initial capital costs required in biotechnology. 
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“commons-expanding” terms was deemed prohibitively expensive, and a misuse of 
funds, even if adequate funds for this purpose could be made available.171 
The non-viability of a “patent-left” strategy left two further options, both of 
which attempted to leverage intellectual property to create a “commons.” The first 
was to consider the use of “patent pools” or other forms of creative cross-licensing 
of patents to achieve openness. This approach—broadly called “BiOS” or Biological 
Open Source—has been attempted in a few areas of biotechnology.172 The main 
examples here are the CAMBIA initiative for pooling agricultural biotechnologies 
and a few other patent pools related specifically to biomedical technologies.173 
While these approaches may prove attractive for some synthetic biological 
applications, the BBF board considered them too exclusionary to provide a general 
solution, since they usually require either some initial patents bartered for entrance 
to the cross-licensing arrangement or else the payment of an entry fee for the use 
of the pooled patents.174 Either approach conflicted with the desire to establish a 
collection of “free to use” biological parts. It is worth noting that a similar dilemma 
has been faced by other non-profit groups, similarly inspired by the example of 
F/OSS, which have also moved away from the creative use of patent licenses to 
more straightforward modes of disseminating materials.175 
 
 171.  For example, on a core assemblage of 10,000 standard biological parts, the patenting 
costs to achieve minimal protection in the United States alone (supposing $25,000 per patent) 
would run to a quarter billion dollars. To achieve worldwide patenting, and on a larger 
assemblage, would cost much more. When confronted with this hypothetical, Drew Endy replied 
that if the BBF ever had such funds, it should spend them on creating new parts rather than 
obtaining patents on existing ones. 
 172.  JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR: THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 316-18 
(2008). An interesting early effort along these lines was a license produced by the Samuelson 
clinic for the BBF that included a scheme for profit-sharing from derivative works produced from 
the initially-licensed intellectual property. The BBF board ultimately decided that this license was 
inappropriate for the kind of user base which it anticipated attracting, as well as likely difficult to 
administer (in its profit-sharing regime). See The BioBricks Foundation: Legal, OPENWETWARE 
(May 14, 2017), http://www.openwetware.org/wiki/The_BioBricks_Foundation:Legal 
[https://perma.cc/47Y3-X5XU]. 
 173.  On CAMBIA, see generally Nele Berthels, CAMBIA’s Biological Open Source 
Initiative, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, 
CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 194 (Geertrui Van Overwalle 
ed., 2009); HOPE, supra note 172, at 316-18; CARLSON, supra note 35, at 203-05. 
 174.  It was argued that charging an entry fee could conflict with the BBF’s need to 
accommodate an anticipated heterogeneous user base. It is true that these fees could be varied—
as CAMBIA’s BiOS is—to reflect both the nature of the licensee (i.e., for-profit or non-profit) and 
the size of the enterprise. The administrative and management burdens that this would impose 
have proven difficult for CAMBIA and were thought inappropriate to an entire field, for reasons 
of scaling, unlike CAMBIA’s specific patents covering agricultural biotechnology. 
 175.  In addition to CAMBIA, the Open Source Seed Initiative seems to have taken a similar 
path. See Jack Kloppenburg, Re-Purposing the Master’s Tools: The Open Source Seed Initiative 
and the Struggle for Seed Sovereignty, 41 J. PEASANT STUD. 1225, 1226 (2014) (“[W]e have 
encountered a variety of technical, legal obstacles to drafting workable licenses that are making 
us rethink our relative emphasis on the normative goal of reintroducing an ethos of sharing for 
germplasm exchange versus the pragmatic goal of creating a legally enforceable mandate for 
sharing.”); see also id. at 1237-41. For a further discussion of the challenges to translating F/OSS 
praxis to seed sharing, see Jack Kloppenburg, The Unexpected Outcome of the Open Source Seed 
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The second possibility mooted was to attempt to follow copyleft not just in the 
inspiration, but also in the details, through the application of copyright to synthetic 
biology. What Rebecca Eisenberg wrote in 1990 remains largely true today: 
“copyright protection for DNA sequences has failed to make its mark outside the 
scholarly literature.”176 That said, post-Myriad, the copyrightability of DNA has 
received renewed attention from legal scholars,177 and at least one company, 
Illumina, Inc., claims copyright in some oligonucleotide primers (though that 
copyright has never been challenged).178 
This thought that DNA (particularly cDNA) might be copyrightable follows 
rather naturally on the analogy between synthetic biology and computing, and the 
extension of copyright to software.179 Legal scholar Andrew Torrance notes the 
“striking”180 similarities between DNA sequences and computer algorithms. If, as 
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CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 199 (2014); Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 
(2011). 
 178.  See Torrance, supra note 177, at 2-3 (discussing Illumina’s claim that its commercially 
available oligonucleotide sequences are protected by copyright). 
 179.  The interest in copyrighting DNA followed the statutory extension of copyright to 
computer code and was discussed beginning in the 1980s. See ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE 
WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE HUMAN GENOME 309-10 (1994); see also Dan L. Burk, 
Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 469, 531-32 (1989); Duncan 
M. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1037, 1104-05 (1986); 
Jorge A. Goldstein, Copyrightability of Genetic Works, 2 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 138 (1984); Donna 
Smith, Copyright Protection for the Intellectual Property Rights to Recombinant 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid: A Proposal, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1083, 1096–108 (1988); see also sources 
cited supra note 177. 
 180.  Torrance cites early geneticists such as James Bonner for the analogy between DNA 
and a computer program. Torrance, supra note 177, at 13. See also JAMES BONNER, THE 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT 134 (1965) (characterizing the genome as a “master 
programme constituted in turn of a set of subprogrammes or subroutines”); François Jacob & 
Jacques Monod, Genetic Regulatory Mechanisms in the Synthesis of Proteins, 3 J. MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY 318, 354 (1961) (“[T]he genome contains not only a series of blue-prints, but a co-
ordinated program of protein synthesis and the means of controlling its execution.”). Legal 
scholar Christopher Holman argues that engineered genetic sequences are analogous to computer 
code because both contain instructions that can be read and executed. Christopher M. Holman, 
supra note 177, at 703 (“In view of the close analogy between software and engineered DNA, the 
further extension to encompass engineered genetic sequences is a relatively modest incremental 
expansion.”). Torrance goes further, suggesting that DNA sequences could be considered a form 
of computer software, rather than simply analogous to computer software. Andrew W. Torrance, 
Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, supra note 84, at 647 (“Rather than portray DNA 
sequences as analogous to computer software, a synthetic biologist might consider DNA 
sequences actually to be a form of computer software.”). 
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Arjun Bhutkar asserts, synthetic biologists aim “to create a programmable 
microorganism from scratch,”181 then, Torrance reasons, genetically engineered 
biological parts should be entitled to the same copyright protection as software.  
Not all legal scholars are convinced. Rai and Boyle also examined this strategy 
in their early article on synthetic biology, but gave reasons to doubt that copyright 
either could or should be extended to synthetic biological innovations. Noting that 
the argument for extending copyright to synthetic biology must depend on an 
analogy to software, they argue that, “software itself fits poorly into copyright’s 
categories”182 because of its algorithmic and partly device-based nature. The 
difficulty arises because copyright should not apply to unique functional 
expressions, only original ones.183 Thus, the extension of copyright law would be 
restricted precisely to those cDNA sequences that have functional analogues in 
terms of protein expression.184  
Such a restriction would (appropriately) defeat the effort to gain a monopoly 
over a genetic function through copyright law, but would thereby limit its utility 
for either commercial or “copyleft” purposes. Perhaps more worryingly, in the 
event that copyright was extended (inappropriately) to DNA sequences with unique 
protein expression, it would introduce monopoly rights of long duration into 
biotechnology, given the much greater length of copyright terms compared to 
patent terms. The ability to achieve a “copyleft” hack using newly extended 
copyright law could thus come at the cost of enabling a much broader “enclosure” 
movement,185 which would run precisely counter to the hope for an open 
development of the field.186 For these reasons, the BBF decided not to pursue an 
 
 181.  Arjun Bhutkar, Synthetic Biology: Navigating the Challenges Ahead, 8 J. BIOLAW & 
BUS. 19, 20 (2005). 
 182.  Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, at 391. 
 183.  As Torrance notes, short sequences of DNA would likely be uncopyrightable; where 
such sequences encode corresponding amino acids, idea and expression would merge. 
Consequently, he argues, these “short building-block sequences of DNA” would remain in the 
public domain, while longer and more complex DNA sequences would enjoy copyright 
protection. Torrance, supra note 177, at 35-36. 
 184.  For a discussion of merger doctrine in biotechnology, see Michael D. Murray, Post-
Myriad Genetics Copyright of Synthetic Biology and Living Media, 10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 71, 111 
(2014) (“[I]f the functioning appears to follow the form of the work, the merger doctrine will 
limit the scope of copyright protection for the original and any derivative works.”). For a 
comparison with uncopyrightable computer programs, see id. at 117. 
 185.  James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (2003) (arguing that the new “enclosure” movement 
in intellectual property is similar to the earlier enclosure of common lands because “once again 
things that were formerly thought of as either common property or uncommodifiable are being 
covered with new, or newly extended, property rights.”) 
 186.  Note that the argument for the desirability or appropriateness of copyright extension 
to synthetic biological innovations may not be changed much by the much-anticipated 
dematerialization of the field. Dematerialization supposes that physical parts will one day cease 
to be relevant, replaced simply by genetic sequence information, which can be transmitted to 
sequencing machines electronically. Successful dematerialization will require that constructing 
DNA de novo become far cheaper, which seems to have been occurring roughly in line with Rob 
Carlson’s prediction that the cost of DNA sequencing technology will fall in an exponentially 
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open agenda for synthetic biology through the expansion of copyright law. 
C.   The BioBrick™ Public Agreement and the Public Domain 
After an in-depth examination of these issues over several years, the BBF was 
left more or less where Rai and Boyle had predicted the field of synthetic biology 
would have to end up: pursuing a “public domain” conception of openness.187 This 
strategy eschews intellectual property claims and seeks instead to motivate 
contributions to a “public domain,” outside property claims.188 As a statutory 
matter, the public domain is a defense against a claim of infringement, the defense 
being that the innovation was already in the public domain.189 Considered 
affirmatively, the public domain presents the ideal of a space free from intellectual 
property rights rather than an ideal of a commons protected through the innovative 
deployment of proprietary intellectual property law.190 Adapting this ideal to 
synthetic biology, the BBF has attempted to find a way to distribute standardized 
synthetic biological parts clear of the encumbering claims of intellectual property, 
even though this means foregoing protections of the kind that a license would 
provide, and which copyleft has relied upon for commons-expansion. 
As discussed in the previous section, the BBF did not intend to develop a public 
domain strategy for building the synthetic biology commons. The background 
thought motivating the initial drafting work191 toward what would later become 
the BioBrick™ Public Agreement (BPA) was that the innovative copyright licenses 
 
declining “cost curve.” See Robert Carlson, The Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies, 
1 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, AND SCI. 203, 207 (2003). Note 
that even a dematerialized field of synthetic biology will arguably remain algorithmic and 
functional, and thus inappropriate for copyright extension for reasons discussed in the paragraph 
accompanying this note. 
 187.  Rai and Boyle suggested in the conclusion to their study that, short of the highly 
uncertain route of pursuing sui generis intellectual property protection, “[i]n the end, a public 
domain strategy . . . may not be ideal, but it is certainly a good start.” Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, 
at 392. 
 188.  The “public domain” has moved from an affirmative defense against claims of patent 
infringement to a core idea in legal scholarship on intellectual property. See JAMES BOYLE, THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN (2008); Boyle, supra note 185 at 58-61; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 147 (1981); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
463 (2003). For the use of the public domain in a research setting, see Stanford University’s patent 
and technology licensing policy, discussed supra note 154. 
 189.  17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). For an overview of uses of the public domain, see Welcome to 
the Public Domain, STANFORD UNIV. LIBR., http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/public 
-domain/welcome [https://perma.cc/ET8D-T77K]. 
 190.  See discussion supra note 188. 
 191.  Mark Fischer was asked by Drew Endy to lead the drafting of the BioBricks Public 
Agreement (BPA). He worked with a small team that included Endy and me, who were both on 
the Board of the BBF, and Lee Crews, a patent attorney at Fish & Richardson. The BBF also earlier 
benefitted from discussions with a group of students and professors working in Pam Samuelson’s 
intellectual property clinic at Boalt Hall, under the direction of Jason Shultz, and from wide-
ranging conversations with other legal academics and open-source advocates and activists. 
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governing F/OSS—preeminently the GPL—were sine qua non contributions to 
peer production. Our early ambition was to achieve a similar legal hack for 
synthetic biology. However, the model of F/OSS proved difficult to port to a 
biotechnological domain governed primarily by patent law, owing both to the cost 
of patents and the functional specifications required in patent claims. The BPA was 
thus drafted with an increasing consciousness that, as the principal drafters came to 
admit, there would be no “slam dunk” legal solution to the problems facing peer 
production in synthetic biology.192  
Without such a solution, the drafters began to consider alternative 
arrangements aimed at rendering intellectual property claims as minimally 
intrusive as possible, a strategy that Mark Fischer described as “check your patents 
at the door.”193 However, in terms of legal requirements, it was not initially obvious 
what such a strategy would require, nor how precisely to effectuate it in the field of 
synthetic biology. Like other scientists, the synthetic biologists working with the 
BBF were familiar with the idea of defensive publication (or disclosure), the 
revelation of a scientific innovation in a public manner that preempts later patent 
claims by others.194 The drafters of the BPA decided to work with this practice in 
mind, with the aim of producing a “public agreement” in lieu of an innovative 
licensing technique. 
After several years of discussion and drafting based on these considerations the 
BioBricks Foundation released the BPA, the first open legal tool for synthetic 
biology.195 Its intended purpose was to avoid intellectual property as much as 
possible, rather than trying to leverage it for commons-expansion. The hope was 
to keep at least a core collection of standard biological parts “free to use” by giving 
them away outside the constraints of intellectual property. Early contributions 
made under the BPA have included the parts built by the first Biofab project,196 
 
 192.  The three lead drafters, Mark Fischer, Drew Endy and I, all came to this view after 
considering alternative approaches over several years. Our work was recognized by the White 
House “Champion of Change” award given to Drew Endy and the BBF. See Drew Endy, Ph.D., 
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/champions/open-science/drew 
-endy,-ph.d.- [https://perma.cc/8ZSN-NGJQ]; see also Open Science Initiative Developed by 
YLS Associate Professor David Grewal ‘02 and Stanford Bioengineer Receives White House 
Honor, YALE LAW SCHOOL, (Jun. 21, 2013) https://www.law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/open 
-science-initiative-developed-yls-associate-professor-david-grewal-02-and-stanford 
-bioengineer [https://perma.cc/V6UT-3WEA]. 
 193.  Personal communication with Mark Fischer. 
 194.  35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(1) (West 2017) (“the claimed invention was patented, described 
in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention”). 
 195.  For the text of the BPA, see BIOBRICKS FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://biobricks.org/bpa/ [https://perma.cc/XT3L-MAAG]. For discussions of the BPA in 
recent legal scholarship, see Torrance, supra note 84, at 659-63; Alison McLennan, Building with 
BioBricks, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: THE NEW BIOLOGY 185-
86, 190-97 (Matthew Rimmer & Alison McLennan eds., 2012). 
 196.  See infra note 310; see also GAYMON BENNETT, BIOFAB HUMAN PRACTICES REPORT 3.0: 
OPEN TECHNOLOGY PLATFORMS: (HOW) SHOULD THE BIOFAB GIVE THINGS AWAY? (2011), 
http://biofab.synberc.org/sites/default/files/HPIP_Report%203.0_v1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/VJ2AMJM6]. 
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associated with the bicistronic architecture used to control gene expression, as well 
as a set of “free fluorescent proteins” that may serve in place of the widely used 
“green fluorescent protein” which is the subject of so many complex patent 
claims.197 
 The BPA is structured as a contract between “contributors” and “users” of 
synthetic biological parts centered on a “non-assert covenant” rather than a license 
of intellectual property rights between a licensor and licensees.198 Instead of 
offering commons-expanding terms to licensees using existing intellectual 
property, it is structured around a “covenant not to assert” any existing (or future) 
intellectual property rights that the contributing party may have, or may later seek, 
against any party who signs the BPA.199 Further, the public revelation of the 
contributed “materials”—dated with a digital time-stamp controlled by a third-party 
certifier200— serves the purpose of defensive disclosure. 
Two features of the BPA deserve particular discussion, both of which should 
be credited to Mark Fischer.201 The first is its innovative structure, which is 
optimized for digital sharing. The second is its reliance on a non-assertion clause 
written into an ordinary agreement rather than a share-alike clause in an 
intellectual property license, which reflects a public domain strategy for building a 
synthetic biology commons. 
The structure of the BPA is optimized for digital sharing and online scaling in 
anticipation of the future growth of the synthetic biology community. Under a 
 
 197.  See Drew Endy, IP-Free EiraCFP (Cyan Fluorescent Protein), IGEM (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://parts.igem.org/Part:BBa_J97000 [http://perma.cc/JLB3-6VAL] (for the free fluorescent 
proteins); see also supra notes 150-51 (discussing the GFP). 
 198.  Contributors do not leverage existing intellectual property rights, as licensors do with 
copyleft in software. In an otherwise illuminating discussion of the BPA (one of the few so far in 
the legal literature), Torrance unfortunately refers to the agreement as a “license” at several 
points; see Torrance supra note 84, at 663-64. Unlike conventional and unconventional IP 
licenses, the BPA does not rely on any existing intellectual property rights, but is, rather, a 
contract structured around a non-assertion covenant. 
 199.  The BioBrick™ User Agreement v1.0, BIOBRICKS FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2016), 
https://biobricks.org/bpa/users/agreement/ [http://perma.cc/GMQ8-D6PT]. 
 200.  The BPA uses the Irish digital-content company Digiprove to certify contributions 
under the BPA with a digital time-stamp and unique fingerprint. See DIGIPROVE (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://www.digiprove.com/index.aspx [http://perma.cc/QD9L-6LWG]. 
 201.  These two features are perhaps BPA’s most innovative, and are both owed to Mark 
Fischer’s insights. A third feature worth mentioning, though not in the specific context of open-
source production, is the commitment that Users make to “refrain from using the Materials in 
connection with any intentionally harmful, negligent, or unsafe uses.” See Biobrick™ User 
Agreement, supra note 199 § 5. The inclusion of this clause reflected Drew Endy’s long-time 
concern, shared by the BBF board, that synthetic biology be developed in an ethically responsible 
manner. Whether it would ultimately prove enforceable or otherwise tractable (given the 
ambiguities in, for example, the injunction against “unsafe” usage) is not altogether clear. 
However, the BPA was understood to be an exercise in normative guidance for an emerging 
scientific community in addition to a legal instrument. The restriction may be of further benefit 
to Contributors by specifying the range of acceptable ways in which they consent to have their 
contributions used. Nevertheless, this clause is under consideration for possible elimination in a 
revision to the BPA, which will otherwise be identical in its essentials, however simplified in 
some respects. 
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licensing model, a concern with scaling would not prove acute, since contributors 
could grant a non-exclusive, worldwide license authorizing the use of materials by 
any user who agreed to abide by its terms (as with, for example, the GPL).202 Given 
that the BPA is a contractual agreement, however, the potential transaction costs 
would become prohibitively high for a community that, if successful, would grow 
exponentially. The BPA addresses this problem by separating out the offer and 
acceptance halves of the agreement into two separate “agreements”—the BioBrick™ 
Contributor Agreement (BBCA) and BioBrick™ User Agreement (BBUA)—which 
each contain terms referencing the other.203 Each Contributor who shares a 
contribution via the BPA (by clicking through and signing the Contributor 
Agreement) contracts with all present and future Users who have or will have 
signed the User Agreement. A Contributor must thus sign a specific Contributor 
Agreement for each contribution, but only once, and not with respect to each User, 
while any User, clicking through just once, gains access to all present and future 
contributions. The effect is to multilateralize the Agreement and reduce the 
transaction costs of what would, otherwise, require separate bilateral contracts for 
each Contribution. This structure was designed in anticipation of a pattern 
observed in other open-source communities, which tend to have more users than 
contributors,204 and thus to avoid the need for Contributors to contract with many 
separate Users while allowing the more numerous Users easy access to a growing 
suite of Contributions. 
The second feature of the BPA worth examining in detail is the non-assertion 
covenant at its core. A non-assertion covenant is a promise by an intellectual 
property rights holder not to assert these rights against others.205 Under the 
Contributor Agreement (BBCA Sec. 3), the Contributor promises not to assert 
against any Users either existing intellectual property rights or any that may come 
to be issued on the contributed material in the future. It is this promise that the 
Contributors give to Users, in exchange for modest commitments by Users, such as 
providing attribution to the Contributor (where requested, as per BBCA Sec. 5) and 
agreeing to use the materials in an appropriate fashion (as per BBUA Sec. 5).206  
In its essentials, then, the BBF’s public domain strategy consists of the verified 
public disclosure of an innovation, which should serve to defeat later patent 
claimants, along with a commitment by the inventor not to pursue infringement 
claims against BPA signatories. The non-assertion clause was drafted to cover both 
 
 202.  GNU General Public License, supra note 112. 
 203.  BioBrick™ Public Agreement, BIOBRICKS FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2016), 
https://biobricks.org/bpa/contributors/ [http://perma.cc/5JMS-LY3Z]. 
 204.  On the differing composition of F/OSS communities, see Kevin Crowston & James 
Howis, The Social Structure of Free and Open Source Software Development, 10 FIRST MONDAY 
(Feb. 7, 2005), http://firstmonday.org/article/view/1207/1127 [https://perma.cc/R49T-H86V]. 
 205.  For an overview, see Anatole Krattiger, The Use of Nonassertion Covenants: A Tool 
to Facilitate Humanitarian Licensing, Manage Liability, and Foster Global Access, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A 
HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007), 
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 206.  As per BBUA § 5. See supra note 201 for further discussion. 
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unpatented material, which is thereby publicly disclosed, and already patented 
material. The BPA does not, however, address the treatment of derivative or 
downstream works that may utilize the innovations so disclosed, as I discuss further 
in the next Part.  
While the contractual nature of the BPA is an important element of the 
Agreement, the BPA nevertheless provides several key benefits to Contributors and 
Users, consistent with a public domain strategy, even if it should fail to be read as 
an enforceable contract. First, as mentioned above, it protects the contributed 
materials from intellectual property claims that others might make through the 
functional equivalent of defensive publication. Second, even if not all the elements 
of the BPA prove contractually enforceable, it is likely that the non-assertion 
covenant at its heart would be upheld, for reasons discussed below, thus protecting 
Users’ rights to contributed materials. Relatedly, the fact that the materials might 
be passed on from a User to a third-party non-signatory, with whom the original 
Contributor lacks privity, is much less worrisome when we consider that the main 
purpose of the BPA is to disseminate new innovations, not to control their 
distribution.207 Finally, the BPA addresses several other elements that are 
important for community coherence, regardless of their legal status. It offers a 
needed clearinghouse function through its digital platform, embeds the norm of 
attribution that has proven important in other peer production contexts, and 
specifies best practices in terms of ethical use.208 
Non-assertion covenants began to receive attention in 2006 when major 
software companies including Sun Microsystems, Microsoft, and IBM announced 
that they would opt not to enforce particular otherwise-enforceable patents they 
owned.209 These promises have been upheld by courts in several different 
instances, which have effectively treated these promises as equivalent to licenses to 
intellectual property. In EOS GmbH Electro Optical Systems v. DTM Corp., the 
Court held that, because of the parol evidence rule, EOS (the exclusive licensee of 
patents owned by another company) was bound by a non-assertion clause stating 
that the licensee agrees not to assert any claims of infringement.210 In a notable case 
involving a non-assertion clause, TransCore v. Electronic Transaction Consultants, 
the Federal Circuit effectively eliminated the distinction between a patent license 
and a covenant not to sue, thereby expanding the exhaustion doctrine in patent 
law.211 Most recently, in Technology Licensing Corp. v. JVC Americas Corp., a 
 
 207.  What would be lost in this instance is mainly attribution where it was requested by the 
initial contributor—an important feature of the BPA but ultimately secondary to the main aim of 
making materials freely available. 
 208.  See BPA, supra note 203. 
 209.  See Krattiger, supra note 205, at 739-40.. 
 210.  EOS GMBH Electro Optical Sys. v. DTM Corp., No. SA CV 00-123DOCMLGX, 2002 
WL 34536679 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2002). 
 211.  TransCore involved a settlement agreement between TransCore, a company that 
manufactures, sells, and installs automated toll collection devices, and Mark IV Industries, under 
which TransCore signed an unconditional covenant not to sue. At issue was whether the non-
assertion covenant in the settlement agreement precluded TransCore from suing Electronic 
Transaction Consultants Corp., which had purchased toll-collection systems from TransCore. 
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district court again treated a non-assertion covenant as, in effect, a license.212 
The rationales for using non-assertion covenants vary.213 For some 
companies, it proves strategically advantageous to allow others to develop 
technology platforms without fear of infringement, given either parallel products 
or limitations of company capacity. Non-assertion covenants may also be used by 
consortia to create open standards and provide conditional, multilateral assurances 
that work to the advantage of the major companies in a sector—sometimes with 
arguably anti-competitive effects—through the requirement that all participants in 
a common technical endeavor forego competition with respect to intellectual 
property.214 Finally, there may be a variety of humanitarian and other reasons for 
which some owners of intellectual property would choose to promise not to assert 
infringement claims against others who use their intellectual property.215 
The BBF’s decision to put a non-assertion clause at the heart of the BPA 
reflected a combination of many of these rationales. It wished to encourage the 
open development of an emerging field—specifically, as I discuss below, a viable, 
open platform—for both scientific reasons and humanitarian ones.216 Additionally, 
the advantage to making the BPA a non-assertion covenant was that it sidestepped 
the question of intellectual property as completely as possible. Rather than 
leveraging existing intellectual property to build a commons, the BPA opted for a 
 
The district court granted ETC’s summary judgment motion and the Federal Circuit affirmed, 
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 212.  JVC asserted that it was protected from patent infringement claims by a non-assertion 
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For its “Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge” aimed at protecting open source software and 
reducing patent litigation, see Patents in the Service of Open Source, GOOGLE (Feb. 3, 2016), 
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Of course, rather than a non-assertion clause, it is also possible to grant a worldwide royalty-
free license to use patented property, as the Gates Foundation did in the case of synthetic 
artemisinin See supra note 85. For a general discussion of non-assertions and world licenses, see 
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 216.  See supra note 27 on the scientific and humanitarian mission of the BioBricks 
Foundation. 
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choice to put otherwise patentable (or, indeed, patented) innovations into the 
functional equivalent of the public domain. By this route, both established and 
emerging parties can use the same legal instrument, whether they are companies 
holding intellectual property rights or academics or other researchers giving away 
innovations without wanting to go through the difficulty or expense of filing a 
patent claim.  
Finally, it is worth noting that in response to the rising threat of software 
patents, the latest version of the GPL (v.3) uses non-assertion clauses very broadly, 
along with mandatory non-exclusive worldwide licenses of existing patents.217 The 
fact that the GPL v.3 employs non-assertion to address software patents confirms 
the difficulty of creating any straightforward analogue to copyleft in the patent 
space. Likewise, smaller non-profit groups dedicated to sharing patentable 
materials have turned to non-assertion and similar strategies.218 The drafters of the 
BPA expect that non-assertion clauses will come to be used more frequently in the 
future by groups of collaborators interested in sharing materials publicly. 
The obvious disadvantage with such a public domain strategy is that it lacks 
the “commons-expanding” character of a GPL-style “share-alike” clause. It was 
understood by the board of the BBF that this would mean needing to mobilize non-
legal norms of sharing and reciprocity to grow the synthetic biology commons, 
since there would be no legal coercion to bring in new contributions.219 However, 
since a major focus of the BBF’s work is education and community-building—from 
its sponsorship of a regular synthetic biology conference series to its collaboration 
with the iGEM competition and its sponsorship of the educational program 
BioBuilder220—it was comfortable with a strategy that would draw on these 
strengths rather than require expensive licensing for those who want to share 
synthetic biological innovations as well as ongoing legal supervision of licensees by 
a small non-profit organization. 
Nevertheless, this disadvantage is not to be underestimated. Under the BPA, 
derivative works that incorporate or otherwise build on contributed biological 
parts can, within conventional legal limits, be patented—and thus kept out of a 
growing synthetic biology commons for the length of a patent term. The de facto 
research exemption may protect most academic scientists from a loss of control 
over innovations that their own work helps to prompt,221 but corporate and other 
 
 217.  Version 3 of the GNU General Public License (GPLv3) Published; Significant Changes 
for Open Source Software Licensing, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Aug. 13, 2007), 
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 218.  See, e.g., Kloppenburg, The Unexpected Outcome, supra note 175. 
 219.  Multiple personal communications with Mark Fischer and BBF board members 
(particularly Drew Endy, Randy Rettberg, Tom Knight), 2010-2011. 
 220.  Biobuilder develops teaching modules to bring synthetic biology into high school and 
early college classrooms. See BIOBUILDER (Feb. 5, 2016), http://biobuilder.org [perma.cc/YF4R 
-R7KY]. 
 221.  See discussion supra note 6. 
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actors—including possibly some groups within the corporatized university222—
enjoy no such protection. Furthermore, while the BPA may help to keep a few key 
parts “free to use,” it does not redress IP-centric practices in industrial 
biotechnology, which can push companies to pursue parallel research agendas 
determined by the distribution of intellectual property rather than the estimated 
likelihood of scientific or technical success, thus slowing the development of the 
field. 
This worry, however, is twinned to an obverse hope. Once it was determined 
that a copyleft analogue was not readily available in synthetic biology, the BBF 
board saw one possible advantage to avoiding a share-alike clause: the emerging 
field might grow more quickly if its for-profit and non-profit sectors could be more 
closely integrated than has been the case with F/OSS and commercial software.223 
By not demanding that derivative works be governed by the same terms as 
contributions under the BPA, for-profit companies should be able to develop 
commercial applications based on contributed parts without fearing that derivative 
innovations must be similarly “free to use.” Given the significant capital 
requirements of biotechnology at present, most start-ups will require significant 
initial investment, which is usually allocated on the basis of an anticipated stream 
of monopoly rents from intellectual property. Under these conditions, a share-alike 
licensing provision could have the effect of depriving them of needed commercial 
loans or investment capital. 
IV.   THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF PEER PRODUCTION 
The public domain strategy adopted by the BBF has brought to the fore 
something largely untested in the case of F/OSS,224 which is how much the success 
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This hope is not merely a rationalizing of the inevitable, though it may have a wine from sour 
grapes character. It would be more plausible if the for-profit sector in this field could be expected 
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XimpleWare, Versata Settle Insurance Software IP Dispute, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/620898/ximpleware-versata-settle-insurance-software-ip 
-dispute [http:// perma.cc/8B2S-P67S]; see also Aaron Williamson, Lawsuit Threatens to Break 
New Ground on the GPL and Software Licensing Issues, OPENSOURCE.COM (Jul. 30, 2014), 
http://opensource.com/law/14/7/lawsuit-threatens-break-new-ground-gpl-and-software 
-licensing-issues [http:// perma.cc/68LZ-W5T2]. Had they been decided, these cases would have 
considered several important issues, among them: (1) whether a third party beneficiary can 
enforce a share-alike provision; (2) whether violations of share-alike provisions would be 
considered copyright infringement and therefore eligible for injunctions and statutory damages 
to be determined in federal court; (3) what damages are appropriate in cases where GPL version 2 
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of commons-based peer production depends on legal enforcement of the terms of 
an unconventional copyright license and how much it is sustained by essentially 
non-coercive norms of community reciprocity. As a practical matter, the BBF has 
pursued its public domain agenda with the expectation that, whatever the 
motivations underlying it, the success of F/OSS in the digital economy reveals the 
possibility of open production. And yet, because its public domain strategy depends 
on non-legal mechanisms to expand the synthetic biology commons, the question 
of the motivation and capacity of individuals to contribute to collective projects 
remains a significant one. Without a commons-expanding license provision, the 
BBF has had to consider the normative foundations of peer production. How will 
the synthetic biology commons grow without a legal requirement imposed on the 
users of contributed parts? And are there non-legal prerequisites to successful peer 
production of the kind that the BBF hopes to galvanize in synthetic biology? 
In this Part, I scrutinize the role of what I call infrastructural prerequisites to 
peer production. These prerequisites can be taken largely for granted in established 
fields. By contrast, I argue that the success of an emerging field such as synthetic 
biology depends on a set of infrastructures that enable production under either a 
proprietary or peer-to-peer model—that is to say, irrespective of the particular legal 
regime governing the distribution of innovation. Too determined a focus on the 
legal regime governing innovation may, in fact, obscure recognition of the 
fundamental role that non-legal infrastructures—shared resources, including 
physical and social platforms, technological routines and processes, and 
institutional norms—play in any kind of production. To varying degrees and in 
different respects, infrastructures prove the bedrock of all successful cooperative 
activity, however pursued. And yet, as I argue below, these infrastructures are 
usually prerequisites to the forms of routine production that they enable, whether 
proprietary initiatives channeled through the market or community-driven peer 
projects. They cannot, therefore, be generated by the activity they enable but must 
usually be available prior to it.225  
Understanding how infrastructure enables downstream innovation allows us 
to recast the debate over the rationality of peer production. A great deal of the 
scholarly literature on peer production has focused not on the design of the 
infrastructures that enable production of either a proprietary or commons-based 
kind, but on the much-debated reasons for which individuals are motivated to 
contribute their labor, time, and expertise to collective creative endeavors that do 
not rely on conventional market incentives.226 The backdrop to this persistent 
focus is the undoubted success of many F/OSS projects and the impetus they have 
given to other efforts at peer production, including the experiment in open 
synthetic biology.  
 
share-alike provisions are violated; and (4) what constitutes a derivative of share-alike code. 
 225.  See discussion infra Part V.B-C. 
 226.  This puzzle has been a persistent one and, unsurprisingly, the subject of ongoing 
research and reflection, including among scholars of intellectual property law. See sources cited 
infra note 231 for a further discussion of these issues. 
Winter 2017          OPENNESS IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 189 
From a conventional perspective, especially as informed by the logic of the so-
called “free rider” problem, this decentralized collaboration presents a puzzle. 
However, as I argue in Subpart IV.A below, the rationality of what Yochai Benkler 
has termed “commons-based peer production”227 may depend on whether 
infrastructures are available to support it. In particular, as I discuss in Subpart IV.B, 
networked peer production depends on a particular kind of shared resource—
platform infrastructures that distinguish a relatively invariable core set of elements 
in a system from a larger, more variable set that uses elements from the core. 
Synthetic biology provides a particularly clear example through which to 
consider these problems since the infrastructural prerequisites for successful peer 
production are not yet established. In their absence, synthetic biology suffers from 
what I call “infrastructure gaps” that currently inhibit the growth of the field, which 
I discuss in Subpart IV.C below. In particular, the networked peer production that 
the BBF now envisages228 requires platform infrastructures similar in architecture 
to those that have enabled decentralized peer production in F/OSS and related 
fields. 
A.   The Rationality of Peer Production 
The backdrop to the puzzle concerning the rationality of peer production is the 
undoubted success of many F/OSS projects. We are now about three decades out 
from the beginning of the GNU Project to create a non-proprietary, complete 
UNIX-compatible software system; about two decades out from the release of the 
Linux kernel under the second version of the GNU GPL; and a decade and a half 
since “free software” was redubbed “open source software,” and immediately began 
to grace the pages of the business weeklies.229 Over the last decade, the example of 
F/OSS has traveled to new contexts, including the ambition to turn biology into an 
engineering discipline. In an increasing number of domains, global networks of 
“knowledge workers” are engaged in sharing, remixing, hacking, and generally 
upending (or wanting to upend) the strictures of “intellectual property” and all the 
commonplaces of what they see as an outdated industrial model of information 
production.230 Many of these projects will undoubtedly fail, according to one 
measure or another. What has motivated academic reflection in this area is the 
surprising fact that so many have already succeeded, some of them with clear legal 
regimes that enable sharing and some without.231  
 
 227.  See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 23, at 375. 
 228.  See infra note 344 on the “bionet” that the BBF is now trying to build. 
 229.  Richard Stallman, supra note 161. 
 230.  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE 
HYBRID ECONOMY (2008). Everything has become fair game: old movies and encyclopedias, 
mechanical devices and the algorithms they embody, pharmaceuticals, and genes. For an 
overview of remix culture, see THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO REMIX STUDIES (Eduardo Navas 
et al. eds., 2015). 
 231.  For two studies of incentives in peer production, see Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some 
Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002); Karim Lakhani & Robert Wolf, 
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The puzzle that peer production of this kind can prove successful must be 
understood in relation to our assumptions concerning the rationality of individual 
contributions to cooperative activity and the role of legal coercion in sustaining 
such cooperation. Specifically, two interrelated arguments orient this puzzlement, 
though often implicitly. The first is the assumption that incremental contributions 
to a collective endeavor are not rational, at least without protection from defections 
by others—an assumption formalized in the free rider problem.232 The second is 
that significant (i.e., non-incremental) contributions to a collective endeavor must 
be understood as exceptional. The corollary to the latter claim is that, as with acts 
of charity in the design of a system for needs provision,233 these exceptional 
contributions should not become the basis for the theoretical analysis of 
production, nor of its institutional design in practice. I largely accept the latter point 
and its corollary, but wish to focus on the first argument above: the claim that 
individual contributions to a collective endeavor are not rational. A claim of this 
kind has been directed against the viability of peer production, and has in turn 
generated a variety of analyses and defenses in response.234  
Across several seminal articles and books, Yochai Benkler has sought to 
characterize the ways in which individuals are motivated to create valuable 
information goods not through employment or other market-based transactions 
but for reasons of recognition, reputation, or other social motivations.235 An 
important early article focused on peer production in F/OSS communities,236 and 
was followed a few years later by a broader analysis of the dynamics of “shareable 
goods,”237 both rival and nonrival, and both inside and outside the digital economy. 
Arguing that cooperative sharing can exist even in the absence of strong social ties, 
 
Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source 
Software Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE (Joseph Feller et al. 
eds., 2005). For a detailed discussion of how legal ambiguity enables cooperation (in the case of 
the transnational open collaboration that produces the annual flu vaccine), see Amy Kapczynski, 
Order Without Intellectual Property Law: The Flu Network as a Case Study in Open Science, 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 232.  The free riding problem is discussed extensively later in this section; for an overview 
of the problem, see text accompanying infra notes 249-254. 
 233.  Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff, Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations, in 
WEALTH AND VIRTUE, 1 (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff, eds., 1983). 
 234.  The literature on peer production is now vast. For a brief history of the genesis of 
F/OSS, see Marshall Kirk McKusick, Twenty Years of Berkeley Unix: From AT&T-Owned to 
Freely Redistributable, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 31 (Chris 
DiBona et al. eds., 1999). For theoretical overviews, see WEBER, supra note 152 and Eric von 
Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the “Private-Collective” Innovation 
Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG. SCI. 209 (2003). 
 235.  See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN: HOW COOPERATION 
TRIUMPHS OVER SELF-INTEREST (2011); Benkler, supra note 21, at 197; BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF 
NETWORKS, supra note 23. 
 236.  In his influential 2002 article Coase’s Penguin, Benkler introduced the term “peer 
production,” which involves large numbers of people collectively and collaboratively producing 
something that continues to evolve over time. Benkler, supra note 23. 
 237.  See generally Benkler, supra note 21 (introducing the concept of “shareable goods” and 
analyzing several forms of social cooperation using this framework). 
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at least under certain technological conditions, Benkler analyzed sharing as an 
important modality of economic production alongside market production and 
state-based (or managerial-hierarchical) production.238  
Benkler’s analysis and defense of sharing has been influential for scholars 
interested in developing more egalitarian property regimes239 and analyzing 
emerging technologies,240 even while it has been questioned or contested by 
others.241 In examining the motivations for such sharing, Benkler notes the social-
 
 238.  See id. at 333. These and other insights were further developed in his later book, The 
Wealth of Networks, in which he argued that the declining costs of communication and access 
to media in the so-called “networked information economy” lead to a new mode of production: 
decentralized, commons-based peer production. BENKLER, supra note 23. He argues that these 
new forms of productive social organization create opportunities for both greater individual 
autonomy and greater economic justice. 
 239.  Jedediah Purdy evokes Benkler’s discussion of lumpy, mid-grained goods, arguing that 
“the proliferation of productive capital on a scale suited to individual ownership, in packages that 
routinely include substantially more capacity than the owner typically uses,” as described by 
Benkler, enables people to engage in productive activity for self-realization, “self-expression,” and 
“even play.” Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-
Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1107-1110 (2007). See also JEDEDIAH 
PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 149 
(2010). Also building on Benkler’s insights, Eric Johnson argues that the degree to which 
intellectual property is “shareable” depends upon the nature of the work: digital content such as 
digital photography, for example, is shareable, because both the camera and individual photos are 
lumpy and granular. Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual 
Property Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1951, 1956-58 (2014). For such lumpy, medium-granular 
goods, money-based market transactions prove less efficient at using excess capacity than sharing; 
markets for such medium-granularity lumpy intellectual works only function, Johnson argues, 
because “creative labors are driven more by intrinsic motivation than external rewards.” Id. at 
1958. 
 240.  See Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency Variables, and Science Commons, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1601, 1628 (2010) (examining the temporal features of information 
commons and observing that the “aggregation and availability of data in ‘science commons’” 
enables effective sharing); Carmit Soliman, Remixing Sharing: Sharing Platforms as a Tool for 
Advancement of UGC Sharing, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 279, 285 (2012) (discussing user-
generated content (UGC) in the context of sharing platforms in which modularity enables 
collective production); Jason R. Wiener, Sharing Potential and the Potential for Sharing: Open 
Source Licensing as a Legal and Economic Modality for the Dissemination of Renewable Energy 
Technology, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 293 (2006) (arguing that Benkler’s model of 
shareable goods is an attractive alternative to market-based models for understanding the 
renewable energy technology characterized by “parallel processing, ease and cost of utilizing 
excess capacity, rapidity of resource’s [sic] decay, and existence of secondary markets for 
capacity”). 
 241.  The portability of Benkler’s model has been questioned, for example, by Steven 
Hetcher, who asks how many examples would fit the model of peer production and notes that 
Benkler himself is cautious about the likelihood of applying peer production models to, say, 
fiction writing given that “modularity and granularity lead to disjunction relative to our 
expectations of novels.” See Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the 
Nature of Peer Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963, 970 (2009). Relatedly, Henry Smith 
asserts that the optimal lumpiness of a resource is empirically variable, and that many situations, 
in contrast to the open-source model, seem to require coordination or market contracting. Henry 
E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE 
L. J. 1742, 1763-64 (2007). 
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psychological discussion of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” motivations for action,242 
arguing that the distinction does not precisely capture the dynamics of sharing that 
concern him. He avoids needing to settle any distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic action, focusing instead on the viability of peer production where goods 
are shareable.243 For the purposes of his immediate argument—delineating and 
defending sharing as a “common and underappreciated modality of economic 
production”244—it is sufficient to note that, owing to a variety of motivations, 
sharing is widespread and effective.245 
It may, however, be possible to go further than Benkler does in defending the 
rationality of at least some forms of sharing by facing squarely the anxiety about 
free riding that hovers behind most discussions of the phenomenon.246 Doing so 
would require contending with the dominant argument for the irrationality of this 
kind of cooperation, which supposes that individual contributors can (and thus 
rationally should) withhold their contributions—devoting their time and energy to 
other purposes—and instead “free ride” on collective endeavors of the kind 
represented in peer production. In the context of intellectual property, this 
argument has been used to support strong proprietary protections on the view that 
free riding will undermine the incentive to produce, absent property rights backed 
 
 242.  Benkler, supra note 21, at 279. The jumping off point for much of the discussion of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in social psychology is what Edward Deci and Richard Ryan 
have termed “cognitive evaluation theory.” See EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC 
MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 129-159 (1985). Siegwart 
Linderberg attempts to make sense of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in this literature through 
attention to goal-oriented behavior, suggesting a “hierarchy of substantive goals” and a “hierarchy 
of operational goals” in which this motivation distinction is recast. Reframed in this way, the idea 
of “intrinsic motivation” is decomposed into elements concerned with “enjoyment” of an activity 
(which turns on what Linderberg calls its “multifunctionality”) and our sense of “obligation” to 
do it (as in norm- or principle-governed activity). In neither of these cases is the external reward 
the (decisive) reason for acting. Siegwart Linderberg, Intrinsic Motivation in a New Light, 54 
KYKLOS 317, 331-338 (2001). 
 243.  It is worth noting that many other studies have emphasized the importance of 
“intrinsic” reasons for contributing to F/OSS projects. For example, in a study of 684 software 
developers working on 287 free or open source software projects, Karim Lakhani and Robert 
Wolf determined that most contributors were motivated by what they characterize as intrinsic 
concerns, such as the need for intellectual stimulation, learning new programming skills, or 
getting around an obstacle by building out the available program. Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 
231, at 3-4, 13-19. Their emphasis on the “intrinsic” reasons for contributing is compatible with 
Benkler’s argument concerning the profile of shareable goods (and may even require shareability, 
though it is not a focus of their analysis). 
 244.  Benkler, supra note 21, at 332. 
 245.  More precisely, Benkler suggests that the example of carpooling is driven by self-
interested (non-market) exchange while the donation of spare computer cycles reflects a more 
generalized altruism comparable to Richard Titmuss’s famous study of British blood donation. 
See id. at 321-23; RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY (1971) (classic study of the motivation and success of unpaid blood donation in the United 
Kingdom contrasted with the paid system in the United States). 
 246.  As Lakhani and Wolf note, many “software industry executives, managers, and 
academics” have been “puzzled by what appears to be irrational and altruistic behavior by 
movement participants: giving code away, revealing proprietary information, and helping 
strangers solve their technical problems.” Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 231, at 3. 
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by legal coercion.247 In an analogy to physical property, it is thought that 
intellectual property protections will bring individual costs and benefits into line, 
thus guaranteeing efficiency—though, as Mark Lemley has shown, this argument 
does not hold up in the case of non-rival information goods.248 
Strikingly, the debates over the rationality of peer production—and thus, 
ultimately, over its viability as a form of production rather than as a hobby or 
expressive practice—mirror older debates over the rationality of cooperation in 
collective projects. The argument that it would not be rational to contribute to a 
collective project can be traced back to Mancur Olson’s famous discussion of the 
“problem of collective action,”249 which came to be called simply, soon after the 
publication of his 1965 book, “free riding.”250 The free rider problem quickly came 
to occupy a central place in studies of collective action in the social sciences, but, 
within a decade or two of its diffusion across the academic subcultures, it generated 
a variety of critical philosophical responses.251 These criticisms have attempted to 
recover an argument for the rationality of individual contributions to joint efforts, 
even in collective circumstances in which each action is small—perhaps even, as 
Olson had put it, unapparent to the other contributors.  
The most important recent contribution to this line of criticism is political 
theorist Richard Tuck’s reevaluation of Olson’s analysis.252 As Tuck summarizes, 
 
 247.  See Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031 1033-46 (2005) (summarizing and criticizing the “free riding” justification for intellectual 
property rights). 
 248.  In the intellectual property context, there may in fact be socially beneficial 
consequences of a great deal of sharing of intellectual property (often described as “free riding” 
though, as I explain below, it is often not the free rider problem analyzed in mid-twentieth-
century public finance and social theory). Lemley has argued that the standard argument against 
free riding in ordinary (i.e., rivalrous) property regimes has to do with the depletion of resources, 
whereas in intellectual property regimes, these standard arguments do not apply. Quite the 
reverse, for with respect to intellectual property, free riding may be both individually rational and 
socially beneficial, subject to the qualification that it not hinder the initial development of the 
intellectual property (the construction of the non-rivalrous good). With that limitation, the 
optimal distribution in intellectual property regimes is as widespread sharing as possible. See id. 
 249.  See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (arguing that 
cooperation in groups where individual contributions are negligible with respect to the whole 
will either be unsuccessful or require coercion to sustain). 
 250.  In his 1965 book, Olson did not himself use the term “free riding” very extensively to 
describe the problem of collective action, even while noting the concern about the “free rider” 
among union organizers; see OLSON, supra note 249, at 76. It came into general use soon after, as 
evidenced by sources cited infra note 251. 
 251.  Among the most important of these are BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS, AND 
DEMOCRACY 13-46 (1978); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 67-86 (1984); Philip Pettit, Free 
Riding and Foul Dealing, in 83 J. PHIL. 361 (1986); Richard Tuck, Is There a Free Riding Problem, 
and if So, What Is It?, in RATIONAL ACTION: STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 147 
(Ross Harrison ed., 1979). 
 252.  See generally RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING (2008). While this Article is the first use of 
Tuck’s analysis of free riding in the context of intellectual property law, it has been used by legal 
scholars working on questions of federalism, criminal justice, voting rights, and environmental 
law and policy. See Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 Yale L. J. 1888, 1895 (2012); Aziz Huq, 
Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalist Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217 274-275 
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Olson’s claim is that “where my contribution to a co-operative activity is relatively 
insignificant—that is, it apparently makes no difference to the outcome whether I 
contribute or not—then I have no instrumental reason to play a part in the 
activity.”253 Tuck shows that, at its heart, this claim turns on the problem of the 
vagueness of the thresholds that mark the point where individual contributions can 
become collectively efficacious in securing a desired outcome.254 
While his argument can only be sketched here, Tuck explains that in the case 
of a precisely specified threshold—as occurs in voting—strategic cooperation among 
agents making even small contributions (e.g., a single vote) may be both desirable 
and feasible.255 By contrast, cooperative endeavors of the kind that Olson analyzed 
are marked by thresholds of an admittedly “vague” or indeterminate variety, above 
which “enough” contributions will have to be made for the collectively beneficial 
result to obtain. These thresholds must be understood as similar to a determinate 
threshold (e.g., fifty percent plus one that governs this condition in the voting 
context), but without a specific or, indeed, specificable amount: “situations 
involving negligible contributions or increments are in fact threshold 
situations,”256 albeit vaguely defined ones. Despite this vagueness, whenever there 
is a boundary to achieving a collectively beneficial outcome, strategic action 
remains possible—just as in the case of voting in which a determinate threshold 
exists.257 The possibility of collectively achieving a beneficial outcome means that 
 
(2014); Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. 
CRIM. L. 1, 61-62 (2012); Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental 
Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1197 (2010). For an interesting contribution to the 
analysis of coordination problems in cyberspace, which does not engage Tuck’s arguments but 
does use the philosophical literature on conventions and coordination games to understand peer 
production, see Hetcher, supra note 240, at 963, 978 (“peer production is properly modeled as 
involving coordination norms or conventions.”). A few years after the publication of Tuck’s book, 
the philosopher Shelly Kagan made a strikingly similar argument against Olson (in apparent 
ignorance of Tuck’s work), developing a parallel analysis of the problem of collective action above 
and below thresholds (including vaguely specified thresholds). Shelly Kagan, Do I Make a 
Difference?, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (2011). 
 253.  TUCK, supra note 252, at 99. It is important to distinguish Olson’s claim, which is at 
the heart of the free rider problem, from several other problems of collective action, which are 
not identical to free riding though often confused with it, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
the problem of voting. For a formal model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see ANATOL RAPOPORT & 
ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 33-36 (1965). For Tuck’s analysis of the prisoner’s 
dilemma as distinguished from the free rider problem, see TUCK, supra note 252, at 19-29. Since 
the negligibility of any individual contribution is at the heart of the free rider problem, “many 
distinctive features of the prisoner’s dilemma disappear at the point at which the agents concerned 
begin to treat their effect on one another as negligible.” Id. at 28. The obvious way in which voting 
differs from the classic problem of public goods provision is that voting takes place in the context 
of a clear threshold: a determinate quantity of votes decides an election. See id. at 36. 
 254.  Tuck, supra note 252, at 64-66, 99-104. 
 255.  Id. at 37-50. 
 256.  Id. at 95. 
 257.  As Tuck writes: 
[w]hile we have essentially inexact knowledge (in some fashion) of where the threshold is to be 
found in sorites cases, and we have exact knowledge in cases such as voting, the basic character of 
our reasoning in the two kinds of cases will be the same. My contribution, even if it is negligible, 
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contribution to many cooperative contexts may be perfectly rational, on even the 
thinnest instrumental notion of rationality, given a reasonable judgment that 
enough other participants are contributing to an endeavor that our own 
contribution will prove causally efficacious.258  
Applying this argument to the case of peer production should reorient our 
inquiry away from a concern with the motivations that lead an individual to 
contribute to what is deemed an irrational endeavor (on the logic of free riding) 
toward a concern with the conditions under which enough individual 
contributions of even a modest kind can prove collectively efficacious in securing a 
desired result. Benkler’s analysis suggests this orientation as well: what he identifies 
as the sharing mode of production reflects, as he recognizes,259 one particular 
pattern of collaboration under favorable social and technological conditions. These 
conditions may be marked by “thresholds”260 that determine the efficacy of sharing, 
based on “technologically contingent physical-capital requirements for effective 
action.”261 If that sharing is undertaken for self-interested or “instrumental”262 
reasons—that is, to enjoy the benefit that a collective outcome provides to an 
individual—these thresholds can be understood as marking the point where 
individual actions can conduce to a desired collective outcome, in line with Tuck’s 
analysis of free riding. For example, considering Benkler’s analysis of F/OSS and 
carpooling, the threshold above which sharing becomes viable would reflect a 
“sufficient” density of widely distributed personal computers or privately owned but 
underutilized (low-occupancy) automobile trips. While the characteristics of these 
“lumpy, mid-grained” goods make them shareable, only a sufficient density of them 
creates the general prerequisites for a sharing modality of production.263  
As I argue in the next section more extensively, this “sufficient density” 
marking thresholds that define the conditions for successful cooperation may best 
be understood in terms of the absence or presence of critical infrastructure that 
enables social cooperation. This infrastructure may be further conceptualized as a 
 
has causal efficacy in bringing it about that the threshold is crossed, as long as enough other 
contributions have been made or will be made. 
Id. at 95-96. 
 258.  Id. at 103-04 
 259.  See Benkler, supra note 21, at 339-41. 
 260.  See id. at 339 (arguing that when a “larger-scale physical-capital requirement is a 
threshold of effective action” the sharing modality will not be widespread); id. at 340 (arguing 
that “technology imposes threshold constraints on effective sharing” without precisely 
determining the extent of that sharing). 
 261.  Id. at 358. 
 262.  Benkler uses the term “instrumental” to mean self-interested in addition to 
instrumentally efficacious. See id. at 279 (contrasting “instrumental” and “noninstrumental” 
reasons for exchange). 
 263.  See id. (on lumpiness and granularity in shareable goods). Benkler argues that 
“[c]reative labor in the context of peer production can be harnessed when a project is broken up 
into discrete modules, whose granularity is varied and sufficiently fine grained to allow 
individuals with diverse motivations to engage in the effort at levels appropriate for their 
motivations . . . .” Id. at 332. 
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kind of platform that makes routine sharing efficacious.264 What Benkler identifies 
in his examples as a sufficient density of widely distributed physical-capital goods 
with excess capacity constitutes an open platform on top of which sharing routines 
can come to be successfully established, with each act of sharing analogous to an 
“application” built on top of it.  
By contrast, where this infrastructure is missing, we can identify what I call an 
“infrastructure gap,” which will inhibit peer production. As I discuss below, the 
success of peer production in synthetic biology may depend on resolving critical 
infrastructure gaps as much as any other obstacle—and creative legal hacks (as 
opposed to public policy changes) can play only a limited role in that resolution. To 
understand why this is so, however, requires an excursus into the theory of 
infrastructure, and of platform architecture in particular. 
B.   Platform Goods as Infrastructure 
Platforms are now widely familiar in the digital economy, though relatively 
under-theorized.265 The revolution in digital computing and the growth of the 
Internet has led to an increased scholarly interest in platforms as a kind of 
“infrastructure,” which has been discussed in a variety of academic disciplines. A 
recent National Science Foundation report on infrastructure, focused on the 
question of cyber-infrastructures, has usefully situated the theory of infrastructure 
with respect to its dynamics, tensions, and design.266 The authors concluded that 
successful examples of historic infrastructures, including the highway/roadway 
system, the electrical grid, the railways, the telephone system, and the Internet, 
become “ubiquitous, accessible, reliable, and transparent as they mature.”267 The 
tensions involved in the maturation of any successful infrastructure include 
disputes over “ownership, management, control, and access,”268 for while 
infrastructures generate “vast benefits,” they also determine winners and losers, if 
 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  The collection of essays in PLATFORMS, MARKETS AND INNOVATION (Anabelle Gawer, 
ed., 2009) is the first major, cross-disciplinary exploration of the subject. The most important 
economic theory on platforms models them as “two-sided markets.” See Jean-Charles Rochet & 
Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EURO. ECON. ASSOC. 990 (2003). 
The theory is motivated, partly, by an interest in open-source platform development. See Josh 
Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Open Source Movement: Key Research Questions. 45 EURO. ECON. 
REV. 819 (2001). For an important extension of platform arguments to consider the legal 
regulation of the new “sharing” or “on-demand” economy, see Sabeel Rahman, The Shape of 
Things to Come: The On-Demand Economy and the Normative Stakes of Regulating Twenty-
First Century Capitalism, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 1 (2016). 
 266.  For the report of a National Science Foundation (NSF) workshop on infrastructure, 
especially cyber-infrastructures, see PAUL N. EDWARDS ET AL., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 
UNDERSTANDING INFRASTRUCTURE: DYNAMICS, TENSIONS, AND DESIGN (2007), http://cohesion 
.rice.edu/Conferences/Hewlett/emplibrary/UI_Final_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ4M 
-XVMF]. 
 267.  Id. at i. 
 268.  Id. at ii. 
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only in a relative sense.269  
A major task for infrastructure creation, then, is careful design, which mitigates 
or manages the tensions of its maturation, with an eye to the dynamics of successful 
infrastructures.270 The focus on infrastructure design parallels in significant 
respects a similar analysis that has been undertaken with respect to the question of 
platform architecture.271 Indeed, platforms may be considered a particular kind of 
infrastructure, which should be understood as a kind of “shared resource” as Brett 
Frischmann puts it.272 Each of the major examples of infrastructure from the NSF 
report could be identified as playing the role of a platform for the production of 
transport, communication, and power. 
The information economy has seen the proliferation of platforms in many 
areas of production. In one of the first attempts to develop a typology of different 
platform types, Annabel Gawer notes the characteristics of “internal platforms,” 
“supply chain platforms,” and “industry platforms.”273 Perhaps the most relevant for 
the hopes of open synthetic biology is what Gawer calls an “industry platform,” 
which enables shared efforts in an entire field. Important industry platforms include 
“Google, the Internet search engine, social networking sites such as Facebook, 
operating systems in cellular telephony, videogame consoles, but also payment 
cards, fuel-cell automotive technologies and some genomic technologies.”274 The 
operating system of a computer provides an obvious example of how an industry 
platform works: “Microsoft Windows is an industry platform—a building block, 
providing an essential function to a technological system—which acts as a 
foundation upon which other firms can develop complementary products, 
technologies or services.” 275 As Gawer notes, and as has been much discussed in 
the scholarly literature, this means it is “subject to so-called network effects, which 
tend to reinforce in a cumulative manner early gained advantages such as an 
installed base of users, or the existence of complementary products.”276 In the next 
Subpart, I discuss the efforts of synthetic biologists to build such a platform enabling 
the rapid and reliable engineering of biology. 
As a general matter, we can consider a platform “a set of common components, 
modules, or parts from which a stream of derivative products can be efficiently 
created and launched.”277 In an elegant and important study, Carliss Baldwin and 
 
 269.  Issues of distribution and fairness are key to positive-sum games, and, arguably, any 
infrastructure may be positive-sum over its absence. 
 270.  Specifically, the authors of the NSF report argue for specific strategies for navigating 
these tensions. See id. 
 271.  BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 
34 n. 25 (2012) (on terminology of platform and infrastructure). 
 272.  See generally id (analyzing the law, economics and policy of infrastructure). 
 273.  Annabelle Gawer, Platforms, Markets and Innovation: an Introduction, in PLATFORMS, 
MARKETS AND INNOVATION 1 (Annabelle Gawer ed., 2009). 
 274.  Id. at 1. 
 275.  Id. at 2. 
 276.  Id. The network effects of platforms have been the subject of an enormous literature 
in industrial organization and intellectual property. See GREWAL, supra note 1, at 324 n.38-n.39. 
 277.  MARC H. MEYER & ALVIN P. LEHNERD, THE POWER OF PRODUCT PLATFORMS (1997). 
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Jason Woodard draw on a variety of scholarly literatures working toward what they 
call a “unified view” of the architecture of platforms, noting that the term platform 
has been used variously in economics, industrial organization, and management 
studies.278 From these diverse usages, they nevertheless extract a convergent 
analysis concerning how platforms function, noting “most importantly, the 
conservation or reuse of a core component to achieve economies of scale while 
reducing the cost of creating a wide variety of complementary components.”279 
This observation leads Baldwin and Woodard to argue that “the fundamental 
architecture behind all platforms is essentially the same: the system is partitioned 
into a set of ‘core’ components with low variety and a complementary set of 
‘peripheral’ components with high variety.”280  
These “common components” are the shared resource that makes platforms an 
infrastructure. Baldwin and Woodward explain that: “[t]he low variety 
components constitute the platform. They are the long-lived elements of the system 
and thus implicitly or explicitly establish the system’s interfaces, the rules governing 
interactions among the different parts.”281 At their most basic, “platform 
architectures are united in that they partition a system into low- and high-variety 
components.”282 A platform might thus be understood as a particular kind of 
infrastructure consisting of shared resources (core components) that allow for the 
development of new capacities (complementary, peripheral components) in a 
network.283 
 
 278.  Carliss Y. Baldwin & C. Jason Woodard, The Architecture of Platforms: A Unified 
View, in PLATFORMS, MARKETS, AND INNOVATION 19 (Annabelle Gawer ed., 2009). Baldwin and 
Woodard analyze three recent waves of scholarship on the role of platforms in technology 
development and organization strategy. The first began with Wheelwright and Clark, who 
described a “platform product” as a product created to “meet the needs of a core group of 
customers but [designed] for easy modification into derivatives through the addition, 
substitution, or removal of features.” Id. at 20. After several successive modifications or additions 
to this basic position, a second wave of scholars interested in the control of technology began to 
study the way in which control of a platform allowed control over pathways of technical 
development and the extraction of rents. Id.at 20-21. This strand of scholarship was influenced 
by the competition between digital platforms (including the “browser wars” of the late 1990s). Id. 
It also intersected with studies of “openness” in design architectures by considering the ways in 
which openness might give one company or group of companies a strategic advantage over rivals. 
Id. A final, influential wave of scholarship on platforms drew on the economic theory of industrial 
organization, particularly concerning technical standards and network externalities, and 
theorized platforms as “products, services, firms or institutions that mediate transactions between 
two or more groups of agents.” Id. at 21 (discussing the work of Rochet and Tirole, supra note 
265, at 58). 
 279.  Baldwin & Woodard, supra note 278, at 19. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Id. at 26. 
 283.  Pier Paolo Patrucco, Innovative Platforms, Complexity, and the Knowledge Intensive 
Firm, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS AND THEORY OF THE FIRM 358, 366 (Michael Dietrich & 
Jackie Krafft eds., 2012) (“Efficient platforms appear when the various incentives and 
complementary capabilities of a multiplicity of actors involved in a heterogeneous network are 
organized and aligned to ensure cohesion and coordination.”). See also id. at 366-70 (discussing 
innovation platforms using Baldwin & Woodard’s insights). 
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Building on their insight, economist Pier Patrucco argues that the division 
between “core components, relatively stable, and peripheral components, 
variables,” is the foundation of the flexibility and innovation that platforms enable. 
Under this architecture, “to generate a new product or to meet a changing external 
environment does not require a radical change in the whole system, but simply a 
change in the peripheral components.”284 The efficiency of platform architecture 
comes precisely from this combination of core elements supporting variation and 
change. The combination reflects, at a deep level, the engineered nature of these 
platforms—which is why otherwise diverse theories of platforms converged on 
it.285 
Elaborating their fundamental insight into platform architecture, Baldwin and 
Woodard proceed to develop a series of “analytical tools” to study platform 
dynamics. They suggest that “two different types of components [i.e., core and 
peripheral elements] can be combined into a working system because pre-specified 
interfaces regulate both sides.”286 These interfaces “must be stable relative to the 
components that depend on them,”287 and they thus constitute part of the platform 
(informing its overall architecture). However the interfaces cannot be too stable, 
for platforms must ultimately be evolvable: “they cannot overly constrain the 
complements or they will reduce the variety and flexibility of the system as a 
whole.”288 
The interfaces that make up a platform thus constitute key junctures in their 
design and control—and the question of how such interfaces were managed would 
probably account for the winners and losers that the NSF study identified in 
historical examples of infrastructure development.289 In terms of business strategy, 
interfaces prove a “source of strategic tension between platform owners and actual 
or potential complementors.”290 Some level of tension in this respect is irreducible, 
because it is intrinsic: the very advantages that platforms provide to innovators 
depend on these junctures. Indeed, even where there is no “platform owner”—when 
the platform is freely available, as with F/OSS governed by the GPL—the 
management of the relationship between source code and derivative, proprietary 
 
 284.  Id. at 370 n.345. 
 285.  Underlying the seeming proliferation of different disciplinary uses, Baldwin and 
Woodard were able to distill the central features of platform architecture because the “things 
called platforms have common roots in engineering design,” and hence allow for the 
identification of structural commonalities, and ultimately a “unified view” of platform 
architecture. They note that, “most platform definitions focus on the reuse or sharing of common 
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 286.  Id. at 26. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  See supra discussion accompanying note 265. 
 290.  Baldwin & Woodard, supra note 278, at 26. Note that this means the decision as to 
what parts of the system are governed by which intellectual property rules is crucial for the 
question of how agents take value out of a network. For an analysis of this point, see generally 
Joachim Henkel & Carliss Young Baldwin, Modularity for Value Appropriation: Drawing the 
Boundaries of Intellectual Property (Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 09-097, 2009). 
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code often turns on this same strategic tension.291 
C.   Infrastructure Gaps in Synthetic Biology 
The digital revolution has been the major prompt to the development of 
theories of platform architecture. The complex dynamics of platform design are 
particularly notable in computing, in which hardware provides the functionality for 
software platforms on which applications run, and also visible in the electronic 
networks that link computers to one another. Similar dynamics, however, are also 
visible in biotechnology platforms. Genetic expression resembles the layered 
architecture of computing: in both domains, combinatorial information stored at 
one ontic level directs the functions of a supervening one.292 This architecture is 
the basis of the “abstraction hierarchy” at the basis of synthetic biology.293 [See Fig. 
1.]  
Given this parallel, the language of platform architecture aptly describes 
processes in biotechnology. As James Boyle argues of both biotechnology and the 
networked computer: “[e]ach is both product and platform. Innovations 
themselves, they are also constitutive technologies that enable still more 
innovations.”294 And, as in computing, the dependence of synthetic biological 
innovation on underlying platforms has generated an interest in community-level 
control of shared resources that fit poorly with intellectual property rights of a 
conventional kind. 
Drawing on the analysis of infrastructure and platforms above, we can 
diagnose what might be called an “infrastructure gap” where a key foundational 
resource is missing, and thereby inhibits productive downstream activity. 
Foundational infrastructures determine the viability of production, especially 
perhaps peer production, where individual contributions to peer projects are 
predicated on the availability of underlying platforms. Infrastructure gaps thus 
mark the limit of effective collective action. 
In my assessment, infrastructure gaps more than any other factor have so far 
limited the much-anticipated success of synthetic biology. The most immediate 
infrastructural prerequisites for its successful development are scientific and 
technical, though background social and institutional norms are vitally important 
(though not my focus at present).295 At a foundational level, it may be helpful to 
 
 291.  Henkel & Baldwin, supra note 290. 
 292.  Indeed, given the functional advantages of such platform architecture, it is perhaps no 
surprise that biology itself seems predicated on a “core-periphery” arrangement that provides for 
individual heterogeneity as the basis for system-wide flexibility. 
 293.  See supra Fig. 1. 
 294.  BOYLE, supra note 188, at 39. 
 295.  The practical realization of the promise of synthetic biology depends, of course, on 
more than the science. It requires a supportive institutional ecology: on active, collaborative, and 
well-funded research scientists and the network of institutions in which they pursue their work; 
on social norms governing the production and distribution of scientific research with public 
purposes in mind; and, at perhaps the highest level of generality, on background features of law 
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conceive a keystone collection of standard biological parts and associated assembly 
protocols as constituting a platform for further innovation. Borrowing from the 
platform theory outlined above, the immediate focus in synthetic biology should be 
on developing “core components” and stable “interfaces” at the genetic level—as, for 
example, in the use of bicistronic architecture to control gene expression. In 
biotechnology, however, this core-periphery distinction may need to be indexed to 
the ontic level in the “abstraction hierarchy” at which a scientist is working. For 
example, the core components at the “parts” level would be standard biological parts 
that are subject to frequent reuse: widely used ribosomal binding site sequences, 
gene coding sequences, promoters, inverters, terminators, and so on will play this 
role.296 The lack of such parts has been a key problem for the field, including for 
iGEM teams,297 and the call to create biofabrication facilities, discussed further 
below, is mostly focused on the construction of high-quality standard parts and 
associated assembly protocols.298 
At a higher level of abstraction, however, and anticipating future 
developments, some of these core parts will likely serve as the foundation for a core 
set of “devices” which would in turn enable “systems,” some of which would be 
widely used (and subject to a low level of variation), thus constituting platforms at 
the device and systems levels.299 The ultimate platform at the systems level would 
be the “programmable cell” capable of serving as a “cellular operating system” 
similar to the platforms used widely in computing.300 Making all this biological 
engineering possible across ontic levels would require a set of stable “interfaces” or 
standards underlying the whole of synthetic biology, most obviously assembly 
protocols, but also shared techniques for measurement, data recording and 
transmission, and the like.301 
Above the cellular level, the platform analogy can be extended to the 
organisms, particularly to microbial host organisms or “chassis” in which cellular 
operations are conducted.302 Several chassis already serve as the “workhorses” of 
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the field, strains of E. coli and Saccharomyces cerevisiae chief among them. Above 
the microbial level, genetically engineered plants and animals, such as variants of 
D. melanogaster (“fruit flies”) or the Harvard Oncomouse,303 provide organismic 
platforms for further innovation. 
Finally, technologies for developing platforms—platforms for platforms—are 
themselves the ultimate infrastructure required for the field’s development. To 
develop a suite of standardized parts and associated assembly protocols, several 
leaders of the field pushed for the creation of a “bio fab,” adapting the idea of a “fab” 
or fabrication facility from semiconductor wafer manufacturing and applying it to 
synthetic biology.304 Chip fabs enabled electrical engineers to separate the design 
and manufacture of semiconductor circuitry—wafers could be designed by one 
group and built by another—and allowed for more rapid prototyping and 
experimentation among designers and more expertise and scale on the 
manufacturing side.305 As the members of this “bio fab group”306 explain: “[t]his 
combination of technology and methodology for designing and fabricating chips—
the ‘chip fab’—constitutes one of the most successful engineering paradigms of all 
time, and it is a valuable model for another nascent technology sector: fabrication 
of biological systems.”307 Chief among the requirements for establishing successful 
biological fabrication facilities is “a way to manufacture long pieces of DNA quickly, 
reliably and at a reasonable price,”308 which would allow for the decoupling of 
conceptual design work and precise, automated manufacturing. The hope is that 
achieving this foundational infrastructure in synthetic biology will “spur advances 
as revolutionary as those achieved in the semiconductor industry.”309 
The first such design-build facility launched in 2009 in Emeryville, California, 
under the recursive acronym BIOFAB International Open Facility Advancing 
Biotechnology (BIOFAB),310 and has since moved to Stanford University. The use 
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Winter 2017          OPENNESS IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 203 
of bicistronic architecture to control gene expression was first achieved by the 
BioFab team, a group of professionals devoted to developing high quality parts to 
be contributed, via the BPA, to the public domain.311 The BBF envisages a global 
network of these biofabs, “high throughput design/build facilities,” for biology 
linked through the Stanford facility. At the same time, several companies offering 
DNA construction services have also branded themselves “biofabs,”312 and a recent 
DARPA program announced in 2011 to support “living foundries” has committed 
over $100 million to building biological platforms.313  
Additionally, with government support of various kinds, several synthetic 
biology companies are now attempting to build platform infrastructures for the 
field. Amyris Technologies has developed a technology for the rapid prototyping of 
chassis, an automated process for constructing and sorting through possible host 
organisms called “automated strain engineering” (ASE).314 The company uses this 
“high throughput robotic assembly of microbial strains,” mainly for developing 
efficient yeast varieties for its work producing chemicals from synthetic 
pathways.315 Gingko Bioworks likewise has developed a robotic process—
colloquially called the “pipe”—for building new strains of host organisms.316 The 
pipe decouples design and fabrication and, through computer assisted design 
software, allows for a much more rapid engineering of biology than conventional 
manual methods.317 These automated platforms for developing host organisms are, 
in essence, highly managed and standardized ecologies serving as the low-
variability core component on top of which organismic variation is stimulated, 
studied, and selected. Broadly speaking, this emerging network of biofabs will work 
to redress crucial infrastructure gaps in synthetic biology. Once DNA sequencing 
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and synthesis can be done quickly, reliably, and cheaply, it will become possible to 
build a platform for synthetic biology, capable of serving as the basic resource for 
decentralized peer production. The network of biofabs might be considered the 
platform for building this platform. 
V.   MARKET, COMMONS, AND STATE IN INNOVATION POLICY 
The discussion in Part IV concerning infrastructure gaps in the development 
of synthetic biology is implicated in a broader question about the relationship of 
technological innovation to the institutional contexts in which it occurs. 
Infrastructure gaps of the kind now afflicting the field are difficult, if not 
impossible, for individual scientists and companies to fill. Necessary infrastructures 
cannot usually be generated either through peer production or through more 
standard forms of market-based proprietary production, outside the exceptional 
case of monopoly production of a platform. In other words, both modalities of 
market and peer production depend on infrastructural prerequisites that neither 
can ordinarily generate. 
As described above, platforms consist in a set of reusable core parts, which are 
the inputs to later instances of decentralized innovation (on either a market or peer 
production model) in which these core parts are recombined in innovative ways. 
The incentive for any market actor to produce such a platform will be limited by 
resource constraints and the fact that the benefits of platform construction will be 
widely dispersed across the field, and thus difficult for any single actor to 
appropriate,318 leaving to one side the social costs of monopoly control of a 
platform. It is true that in exceptional cases of private provision, a powerful 
company—a monopolist or market-leader—may be able to provide public 
infrastructure, but this will usually occur where the profile of future uses is 
relatively settled (e.g., building a road or rail line between known terminals). 
Private platform construction for entirely new endeavors—for example, synthetic 
biology rather than a new social media app—will usually run up against the problem 
that private investment in the platform must be undertaken without an adequate 
sense of the later uses of a public good with uncertain market value.319   
Similarly, decentralized peer production will also prove generally incapable of 
producing fundamental infrastructure because it presupposes the sharing of 
incremental innovations among peers working on a common platform. If one party 
has the capacity to produce a new platform for others, it may best be conceived as 
an extraordinary gift by an exceptional individual, not the collective product of a 
network of equal contributors. For example, the initial work of Richard Stallman 
on the GNU project and of Linus Torvalds on the Linux kernel320 were significant 
enough contributions to launch or transform F/OSS communities. These 
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the GNU project); id. at 89-91 (discussing Linus Torvalds and Linux). 
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communities were, in essence, constituted by exceptional founding gifts of code, 
and they could not have been independently generated in a coherent manner. 
For these reasons, the work of building platforms will generally fall to a public 
agency, even if that agency is made effective in partnership with private actors. 
More particularly, the possibility of achieving openness in emerging technical 
domains may depend on favorable public support to enable the production and 
distribution of infrastructural prerequisites for peer production. However, the 
recognition of the state as the dispositive context for innovation—apart from its 
familiar role in granting and enforcing intellectual property rights—has been largely 
neglected in contemporary legal scholarship.321 
By contrast, a variety of academic literatures and policy discussions have 
persuasively linked the problem of innovation, particularly with respect to 
fundamental technological infrastructures, to public policy and state action. For 
example, the social science literature on industrial policy has sought to situate 
innovation in the context of state action.322 In many countries, this is an obvious 
theoretical move, given explicit national industrial policies.323 In the United States, 
however, it is less familiar, perhaps because the U.S. government disavows any 
explicit industrial policy and instead pursues innovation through what sociologist 
Fred Block has termed a “hidden” developmental state.324 Block notes that over the 
past three decades—during a time of generalized public funding cuts—the U.S. 
government has dramatically expanded its financing of technological 
development.325 However, the ideological predominance of what Block calls 
“market fundamentalism”326 has forced this public investment into relative 
obscurity. The result is a “hidden development state”—more specifically, a 
“developmental network state” in which interconnected agencies support the 
production of fundamental innovation.327  
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-be-held-march-28-and-29 [https://perma.cc/ZM7S-N9VH]. 
 322.  See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Links and Impacts: The Influence of Public Research on 
Industrial R&D, 48 MGMT. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 13-14 (2002) (summarizing the results of 
research into impact of public R&D funding); see generally Block, infra note 324 (on the “hidden” 
industrial policy of the US, which operates through a host of scientific funding bodies). 
 323.  See James Foreman-Peck & Giovanni Federico, European Industrial Policy: An 
Overview, in EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY 426 (James Foreman-Peck & Giovanni Federico eds., 
1999) (discussing the varieties of European experience with industrial policy). 
 324.  Fred L. Block, Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental 
State in the United States, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 169, 170 (2008). 
 325.  Id. 
 326.  Id. at 170. For Block’s analysis of market fundamentalism, see generally FRED BLOCK & 
MARGARET R. SUMMERS, THE POWER OF MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM (2014). 
 327.  One negative consequence of this hiddenness is to remove from public discussion the 
success stories that would bolster government support of industries. Block, supra note 324, at 
194. 
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There are numerous problems with having an industrial policy that cannot 
speak its name, particularly problems of industry capture and inadequate 
deliberation, which come from a lack of transparency about development 
priorities.328 Despite these shortcomings, the hidden U.S. innovation policy has 
been successful in stimulating developments across a range of scientific and 
technical fields through a host of federal agencies, including the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy, and several 
others.329 By subsidizing the creation of computer science programs at major 
universities and funding progress on human-computer interfaces, DARPA was 
instrumental in enabling the creation of the personal computer, the Internet, and 
other groundbreaking systems that function as digital platforms. With respect to 
advancing biotechnology and drug development, NIH has played an analogous role, 
albeit with a peer-driven and open-ended focus that has proceeded in a more 
transparent if also more protracted manner.330 Similar advances in other areas are 
unlikely, Block argues, without increasing the role of the federal government in 
brokering, funding, and facilitating opportunities for innovation.331 To these tasks, 
we might also add the state’s capacity to guide otherwise competing companies to 
share fundamental research, thus scaling up the resources available to tackle sector-
wide infrastructure gaps, as seen in the creation of SEMATECH in the semi-
conductor industry.332 
Block’s work focuses attention on the role of the state in the creation of 
technological innovation, which has been too often neglected in legal-academic 
discussions.333 Indeed, apart from its direct role in granting and enforcing 
intellectual property, the “state” has been strangely missing in the legal literature on 
innovation.334 Amy Kapczynski, one of the few legal scholars to note this problem, 
argues that intellectual property scholarship needs “a serious, curious engagement 
 
 328.  With those shortcomings in mind, Block advocates for a new paradigm of state 
involvement that would require (1) reciprocal benefits from corporations to be transferred to the 
public in exchange for public support; (2) greater social inclusion regarding the benefits of 
technological development; (3) increased public deliberation over funding priorities; and (4) a 
redeployment of public monies beyond the narrow focus on military applications. Id. at 199. 
 329.  Id. at 174-79. 
 330.  Id. at 178-179. 
 331.  Id. at 199-200. 
 332.  See generally Larry D. Browning et al., Building Cooperation in a Competitive 
Industry: SEMATECH and the Semiconductor Industry, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 113 (1995) (on the 
role of SEMATECH in fostering a framework of cooperative competition among semiconductor 
manufacturers). 
 333.  For a notable exception, see Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: 
Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (1999). See 
also supra note 321 (on two Yale Law School conferences aimed at remedying this neglect). 
 334.  For a wonderfully lucid discussion of this problem, see Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual 
Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 132 (2014) (arguing that both supporters 
and critics of conventional intellectual property adopt an overly limited view of the state as a 
“neoliberal Leviathan,” even while assuming basic state capacities). 
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with the state of the modern state.”335 Intellectual property scholarship has instead 
tended to maintain a narrow focus on the legal regime governing access to 
knowledge. It is true that the insurgency of F/OSS motivated an influential subset 
of intellectual property law scholars to probe the relations of community-based 
reciprocity and non-market peer production. However, the role of the state in 
enabling this production does not take priority in these investigations, perhaps 
partly because of a background commitment to viewing F/OSS as an instructively 
anarchistic endeavor.336 The state’s influence on openness has generally been 
relegated, positively, to enforcing the copyright law that can be hacked for copyleft 
and, negatively, to putting regulatory obstacles in the way of openness.337 
I can do no more at present than to sketch some of the ways in which “bringing 
the state back in”338 would matter, with a focus on the specific case of synthetic 
biology. As the analysis of the public domain strategy above should have made clear, 
the difficulty in adapting conventional intellectual property law to support sharing 
in the biotechnology space is one that only state action can effectively redress, 
especially since copyleft-style hacks seem inadequate to the task. Reforms of 
intellectual property law could take the form of creating sui generis rights specific 
to biotechnology,339 better registries for conducting patent searches determining 
the state of prior art,340 and perhaps extending the carrier liability exemption and 
the take-down notice regime familiar from copyright to patent.341 These and other 
 
 335.  Id. at 132, 145 (“A call to bring the state back in is not a call to dislodge the generative 
new work being done on the commons, but rather to suggest that there is today no viable form 
of a prepolitical commons, and that theorists of the commons need to make space in both their 
accounts of the commons, and in their articulations of the political domain that they wish to bring 
into being, for a postneoliberal image of the state.”). 
 336.  See Yochai Benkler, Practical Anarchism: Peer Mutualism, Market Power, and the 
Fallible State, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 213, 220-26 (2013) (analyzing peer production as an anarchistic 
mutualism); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, 
FIRST MONDAY (Aug. 1999), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/684/594 
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negative assessment, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 23, at 379-
382, 470-71 (discussing how state policy is “tilted” in favor of proprietary IP). 
 338.  For an analogous move in political sociology, see BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (Peter 
Evans et al. eds., 1985). Amy Kapczynski argues persuasively about this move in intellectual 
property law scholarship. See supra note 334. 
 339.  Rai & Boyle, supra note 108, at 392. 
 340.  Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and 
Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 123, 143-151 (proposing an open review process for patent 
applications) (2006); see generally Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power Over Fact-Finding in the Patent 
System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 907 (2004) (analyzing reports by the Federal Trade Commission 
and the National Academy of Sciences on the allocation of fact-finding powers within the U.S. 
patent system, including reform proposals for the functioning of the Patent Office). 
 341.  To make peer production more viable outside software and visual content, the Safe 
Harbor and associated takedown procedures established under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012) currently restricted to copyrighted works, could be usefully 
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reforms would have the purpose of making sharing easier, particularly of 
foundational advances in the service of platform construction. 
Other than reforming the intellectual property landscape, public funding 
provides the most obvious role for state action. Private financing of foundational 
technological development, including infrastructure provision, is likely to be both 
inadequate (given the shorter planning-horizons of private firms) and inefficient 
(to the extent it is incentivized through the granting of monopoly rights over 
innovations). Neither are community-led efforts likely to be successful where there 
is not yet an existing platform on which decentralized peer production can proceed. 
Large private philanthropies can play a role in delivering needed resources, but they 
are themselves hybrid public-private organizations, given the prominence of tax 
policy in creating them. In terms of funding, only the state can reliably provide the 
resources necessary for the platform construction that must precede either 
successful peer production or proprietary development. Again, it can do so in 
various ways, including through delegated agencies, peer-reviewed competitive 
processes, and tax incentives for private philanthropy. 
If the state is the essential or ultimate provider of infrastructure, the dynamics 
of this provision ought to be part of the analysis of F/OSS beyond the more 
particular concern with the details of licensing regimes. For, as I argued above, the 
availability of adequate infrastructure may determine the thresholds marking the 
rationality of peer production.342 The dynamics governing the provision of such 
platforms should become a central part of our investigation into open innovation. 
Recognition of the state as the ultimate provider of platforms is essential to 
synthetic biology in particular, owing to the infrastructure gaps inhibiting the field. 
Public power is needed to build platforms—which is to say, to regulate, finance, 
coordinate, and support the networked construction of them—for the sake of the 
downstream innovation they enable. Initial moves in this direction are already 
beginning: the DARPA grant to support “living foundries” envisages precisely this 
kind of platform construction,343 although this funding remains small in 
proportion to the required resources. The BBF has recently begun a new initiative 
to prompt a major infrastructure development for biotechnology—producing a 
“Bionet” for the sharing of biological materials—with a generous grant from a 
private philanthropic foundation.344 Ultimately, however, the success of this 
endeavor will depend on being able to use philanthropic money to leverage broader 
public-private partnerships and government financial and regulatory support of the 
 
extended to online databases for genetic materials and other patentable areas. Such an extension 
would not only support sharing but likely reduce patent infringement. 
 342.  See text accompanying supra notes 259-265. 
 343.  See text accompanying supra note 313. 
 344.  The project is the establishment of a “BioNet” for the rapid sharing of synthetic 
biological parts, which is in the early phase of its development. See programs/BIONET, 
BIOBRICKS FOUND. (Apr. 8, 2017), http://biobricks.org/bionet [https://perma.cc/UZZ7-V5FT]; 
see also The BioBricks Foundation, HELMSLEY CHARITABLE TRUST (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://helmsley79.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=52025383&item=5 [https://perma.cc/5SXJ 
-N7FZ]. 
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kind that Block describes in his analysis of the networked developmental state. 
Why should the state prove central to platform construction? While it may be 
possible to provide at least some infrastructure on a private basis,345 infrastructural 
resources—as with all public goods—will tend to be undersupplied if left to 
individual market participants.346 Yet the state may have this special role for 
reasons that go far beyond the well-rehearsed arguments concerning public goods 
provision. Understanding this role may require asking what kind of goods 
platforms are—and what kind of thing a state is.  
The theory of platforms discussed in Part IV.B above suggests that a platform 
is not essentially material, but rather a materially embedded social practice. It is 
dependent upon the coordinated demarcation of an established core from 
peripheral routines; in other words, it is a coordinating convention that enables 
derivative forms of cooperative action. Yet the established core and associated 
interfaces of a platform cannot be indelibly fixed, for platforms must be able to 
evolve over time, relying on higher-order forms of coordination that facilitate the 
construction of new platforms.  
But what coordination regime can enable the production of new regimes of 
coordination? It is not turtles all the way down: the state, understood as political 
infrastructure, is the foundation of this process.347 Describing the nature and 
essential functions of the modern state has been the project of political theory since 
the term—lo stato, l’estat, the state—was transformed from the description of a 
ruler’s status to an abstraction concerning a form of political regime, initially in the 
consolidating monarchies of early modern Europe.348 It should come as no surprise 
that the state should prove the predominant provider of infrastructure as well as 
the platform-enabler of last resort once we recognize that it is the main social 
instrumentality charged with generating coordination regimes, whether through 
direct government agencies or the generalized sociability that law enables. The state 
is itself the foundational coordination regime that allows further forms of 
coordination, a meta-platform or platform of platforms.  
 
 345.  See FRISCHMANN supra note 271, at 95-99. 
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It seems fitting that the success of synthetic biology, which would enable the 
reengineering of the natural world, should ultimately depend upon the successful 
mobilization of state capacity—that is, upon our political self-construction.349 After 
all, the foundational defense of the modern state was as a political technology that 
would enable the collective engineering of our social life. The extension of this 
possibility to the natural world is the ambition of synthetic biology today, and the 
hopes for the open development of the field reflect the profound stakes of such a 
radical ambition. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Legal scholarship on intellectual property needs to be reoriented to consider 
how state action works to generate the infrastructure of emerging fields in ways 
that prove conducive—or inimical—to their open development. In this Article, I 
contributed to that reorientation through an in-depth analysis of one important 
emerging technology. I argued that the success of open development in the field of 
synthetic biology depends not only on the particular form of legal license or 
agreement used to govern the distribution of innovation, but on overcoming 
infrastructure gaps that inhibit cooperative action for collective outcomes. Such 
cooperation is the hallmark of peer production in the information economy, and 
the hope of many synthetic biologists is to replicate that success. 
The ambition of synthetic biology is to “make biology easier to engineer” 
through standardization and associated technical processes. Early successes indicate 
the promise of this field and help to explain why advocates of openness are 
concerned to see it develop in a publicly beneficial manner. What openness might 
mean in the patent-dominated context of biotechnology remains unclear, however, 
and has required a reassessment of the analogy to “copyleft” that had provided initial 
inspiration to the scientists and activists interested in open synthetic biology. I 
focused especially on the role of the BioBricks Foundation in this effort and 
explored the rationale behind the decision to pursue a “public domain” agenda via a 
new legal agreement, the BioBrick™ Public Agreement. 
The success of this public domain strategy depends on the viability of peer 
production without the advantages of legal coercion available through a “share-
alike” licensing provision. In scrutinizing the motivations behind peer production, 
I borrowed from recent philosophical work critical of the conceptualization of the 
free rider problem to argue for the rationality of decentralized cooperation, even 
where individual contributions to a collective project are small. The rationality of 
such cooperation depends, however, on threshold effects that mark the 
efficaciousness of individual action in collective endeavors. In the context of 
intellectual property, I argued that these thresholds are determined by the presence 
 
 349.  Both aims were prefigured in Hobbes’s first and unsurpassed description of the modern 
state as, at once, an “Artificiall Man” and a “Mortall God.” See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 10, 
120 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991). For criticism of this modern social regime and the hypostatizing 
mindset that accompanies it and its technologies of power, see supra note 51. 
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or absence of shared technical platforms. Platforms are special kinds of 
infrastructure, as recent work from law and political economy on infrastructure has 
shown. The question as to how such platforms are to be produced led to a discussion 
of the role of state action in the creative economy. I argued that the success of 
openness in synthetic biology depends on infrastructural prerequisites that, 
ultimately, only the state can provide. Such state action may proceed, however, 
through “hidden” modalities of the kind that theorists of industrial organization 
have identified, and which ought to be a central concern of legal scholars and 
advocates interested in the theory and practice of open source. 
 
 
 
